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Review

Reviewed Work(s): Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons by Tu Wei-ming

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Wakeman's claim that these activities in Shanghai are somehow significant in explaining the origins of the Pacific War is not substantiated. The ending of the study in 1941 creates only artificial support for this thesis. In terms of internal Chinese politics, the study fails to break any new ground—unless the reminder that Chinese politics had an underside is considered as such. Wakeman follows conventional divisions over who might be a puppet or a collaborator, without raising any questions about these terms themselves (e.g., “Chinese resistance to collaborationist rule,” as if collaborationists were somehow not Chinese).

*Shanghai Badlands* offers much material to be pondered by historians of World War II in China and Shanghai (especially in its footnotes), but it fails to deliver what it promises.

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*Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons.* Edited by Tu Wei-ming. (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996. Pp. xii, 418. \$45.00.)

Almost half a century ago, Max Weber pointed to religion as a possible factor in the emergence of capitalism in the Protestant West and the absence of it in Confucian China. Joseph Levenson likewise attributed China's failure in modernization to Confucian amateurism. On the other hand, in 1979, before the Four Mini-Dragons—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—rose to their present prominence, Herman Kahn pioneered in linking the economic success of East Asia to Confucian values. Aware that Confucianism embodies multifarious dimensions and nationalities, and that cultural heritage alone cannot explain complicated socio-political-economic phenomena, the contributors to *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity* avoid making dogmatic correlation between Confucianism and the failure or success of East Asian modernization. Rather, they “take the Confucian dimension as the point of entry” for their sophisticated and insightful “inquiry into the dynamic interplay of intellectual, social, and economic currents in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons” (1). They are less successful, though, in tackling the stated *Problematik*, “how a fiduciary community can come into being through exemplary teaching and moral transformation” (1).

The volume consists of four parts. In Part I, “Intellectual and Institutional Resources,” William Theodore de Bary criticizes Neo-Confucian elites for favoring self-cultivation and autonomy at the expense of institutionalized universal education. Edward Shils finds in classical Confucian humanism a rudimentary intellectual foundation of civil society. For Chang Hao, the Confucian statecraft of “ordering the world” accommodated decentralization within the bureaucratic system. Lu Shu-hsien sees a New Confucianism in contemporary Chinese societies.

In Part II, Watanabe Hiroshi shows how the Tokugawa Confucianists' glorification of the West, as a realization of the idealized Confucian Three Dynasties, signaled the beginning of the decline of Confucianism in nineteenth-century Japan. Samuel Yamashita documents the Confucian material in ethics textbooks from 1904 to 1945. Robert Smith sees an unconscious Confucian connection in Japanese moral education, family ethics, and the civil code. Shmuel

Eisenstadt analyzes Japanese assimilation of Confucianism and Buddhism into its political and social institutions.

In Part III, Koh Byong-ik and Kim Kwang-ok illustrate that, although South Korea is the most Christianized of all East Asian countries, its social network remains Confucian, albeit without collective consciousness. Ambrose King notes that in Taiwan, the Confucian conception of the maximum state has led the government to assume full responsibility for economic development, with the unintended consequence of the emergence of civil society. Thomas Gold, however, traces Taiwan's civil society to non-Confucian and mostly Western elements.

In Part IV, Ambrose King attributes Hong Kong's "rationalistic traditionalism" to refugee status and exile mentality. John Wong dismisses cultural explanations for Singapore's progress. Eddie Kuo analyzes the failure of Singapore's state-promoted "Confucian movement." Gordon Redding and Gary Hamilton analyze overseas Chinese capitalism against the backdrop of Confucian familism.

The volume is inspirational, informative, and challenging. One only wishes that a set of common issues could be addressed systematically for a more focused comparative study of the various regions, and that a forum could be created to engage authors of opposing viewpoints in more vigorous dialogues.

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#### EUROPE

*The Politics of Punishment: Prison Reform in Russia, 1863-1917.* By Bruce F. Adams. (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996. Pp. viii, 237. \$35.00.)

The author of this study sets out to revise the dismal picture of Russian prisons painted in late nineteenth-century works by George Kennan and Peter Kropotkin. Based on close reading of state ministerial archives, Bruce Adams concludes that by 1917 reform "gradually made [Russia's] prisons cleaner, roomier, healthier places" (9). Adams's thesis is convincing, although he could do more to relate it to broader historical and historiographic themes.

Adams argues that enlightened opinion in Russia had turned against corporeal punishment even before the Great Reforms. Borrowing from Western thinkers, reformers believed that Russia as a civilized country could not tolerate barbaric punishment. Adams describes the 1863 law ending corporeal punishment as a case of enlightened sentiment outstripping Russian reality. Ending corporeal punishment required that more criminals be sent to Russia's dilapidated prisons and thus created the need for prison reform.

Again borrowing from the West, Russia's reformers conceived of prisons as corrective institutions; labor in particular was believed to have redemptive qualities. But prison reform fed into interministerial struggles, as Adams shows in his reconstruction of the work of successive state commissions on prison matters. The Ministry of Internal Affairs sought to centralize prison administration, but found its efforts at fundamental reform frustrated by the Ministry of Finance's tight budgetary policy and by conflict with the Ministry of Justice.