erous time frame of one or two centuries. In an era of increasing globalization, they are left with perhaps only two choices: to become or not to become a member of the capitalist world system while under heavy pressure from without—and from within, in the form of rising expectations among their own impatient citizens. This is a big challenge and presents LDC planners and policy makers with cruel choices—as Denis Goulet succinctly illustrated in a succession of studies back in the 1970s. Thus Fengshui 風水 may not necessarily be the perfect example of Eastern tradition, just as the computer may not be the ideal symbol of the totality of Western civilization. In other words, in the struggle to reach the top, what room is left for latecomer developing countries in an ever-expanding capitalist hegemonic world system? Can they afford the luxury of holding to tradition at the cost of modernization, however defined?

Altogether, *Anywise* is a book about architecture, but it is also a book about urbanization, modernization, and development, viewed particularly from the standpoint of the contrast between East and West. Globalization, growth, the information age, modernity, postmodernity, technology, and tradition are all touched upon. Scholars in architecture, planning, sociology, and development—and policy makers as well—should all be able to draw both theoretical and practical inspiration from this book.

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Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming, editors. *Confucianism and Human Rights.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. xxiii, 327 pp. Hardcover $40.00, ISBN 0–231–10936–9.

In their highly publicized media events in both the United States (October 1997) and China (June 1998), Presidents Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton expressed disagreement on their respective views on human rights. Reporting on these summit meetings, the American news media further exacerbated the difference by using the Tiananmen Square mass demonstrations of Spring 1989 and the subsequent Beijing massacre on June 4 as convenient points of reference. Granted that the television image of government tanks and guns against helpless Chinese students

and civilians had been indelibly seared into the minds of the American viewing public in particular and the people of the world generally, China has nonetheless indeed made great strides in improving the lives of a large portion of its populace since that tragedy of almost a decade ago. Still, manifesting a kind of sleeping beauty syndrome, Dan Rather of CBS, for example, implied during the Clinton visit that until the arrival of the American president, China had not even considered the issue of human rights. In fact, prior to the Clinton visit, Vice Premier Qian Qichen announced that China will sign the main United Nations human rights convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), just as it did the companion convention, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) shortly before the arrival of President Jiang in Washington, D.C., in October 1997.[1]

Confucianism and Human Rights consists largely of the proceedings of the first across-the-Pacific conference (at the East-West Center, University of Hawai'i, August 1995) to address the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, subsequent developments, and the expansion, especially in recent decades, from its original focus on civil and political rights (1948) to economic, social, and cultural rights (mid-1970s) to the group rights of a people for survival and self-determination in a shrinking planet (1990s). At the Hawai'i conference these different generations of interdependent and mutually potentiating human rights were all carefully examined from the perspective of one of China's own cultural traditions, namely Confucianism.

In addition to such organizations as the American Council of Learned Societies, the East-West Center, the Heyman Center for the Humanities, and the Human Rights Center of Columbia University, a major sponsor was the China Confucius Foundation (established in Beijing in 1984). The conference brought together a high-powered coterie of East Asian studies specialists, philosophers, historians, political scientists, and law professors—most of whom were knowledgeable about Chinese and East Asian as well as Western traditions. Eighteen essays are included in this volume.

From this book we learn that since the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and the subsequent waning of Marxist-Maoist ideology throughout China, Confucianism has been steadily reemerging as an integral part of China's cultural tradition. Seen in light of the bashing of the "Confucius shop," sustained for almost eight decades since the May Fourth Movement (1919), and the sporadic campaigns against Confucius (as the major obstacle to China's progress and modernization) in the Maoist era, this resurrection of the ancient sage and his teaching is nothing short of remarkable.

Renewed interest in Confucianism in China began with a conference on Confucius within China in Hangzhou in 1980. After timid positive public expressions of Confucianism at that meeting met with no opposition or criticism from

politically correct Marxists, it was apparent that Confucianism was no longer a taboo subject in China. Despite the Tiananmen tragedy of 1989, an international symposium on Confucius was held in Beijing in October that same year to celebrate the purported 2,540th birthday of Confucius.

Five years later another international congress on Confucianism was again held in Beijing, in October 1994, on Confucius' 2,545th. To give the keynote remarks at that conference was none other than Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, who had stood up to U.S. president Bill Clinton by insisting on an "Asian" version of human rights when the latter interceded for an American youth (Michael Faye) who was arrested in Singapore for defacing cars with graffiti and, as punishment, sentenced to six strokes on the buttocks.

It was at the 1994 conference that Beijing organized the International Confucian Association to establish links with and to tap into the international scholarship of the Confucian tradition. Somewhat uneasy about the apparent utilitarian interpretation of Confucianism by the authorities in the People's Republic, Wm. Theodore de Bary and others suggested joint sponsorship of an international conference on Confucianism and Human Rights with the following possible areas to explore:

1. Confucian concepts of the self, person and individual in relation to the state and society. Self-discipline as the key to governance.
2. "Rights" protected in Confucian ritual and Chinese law, the relation between rights, responsibilities, and duties.
3. Human rights in the perspective of Confucian concepts of social justice.
4. Religious and intellectual freedom in the Chinese and Western traditions.
5. Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law in China and the West.
6. A reappraisal, in historical perspective, of the earlier critiques of Confucianism (especially the May Fourth Movement). (p. xviii)

Many of the Confucian scholars outside China were somewhat apprehensive that after the demise of Maoism-Marxism in the People's Republic, the ruling party in China would use a truncated version of Confucianism to their own liking to reestablish its legitimacy and to shore up its position of power. Neither do these scholars want to see an "Asian" version of human rights being promulgated against the Universal Declaration, as some authoritarian African nations had already claimed for their regimes by aping Lee Kuan Yew's and now possibly China's version of human rights.

At the 1995 conference, a strong, purist Confucian self-definition of people "in terms of kinship and community rather than as rights-bearers" (p. 64) was expressed by Henry Rosemont, Jr., who described American society (despite its rhetoric on rights) as the most "conflicted." Rosemont claims that "the conceptual framework of rights, within which human beings are seen as free, rationally choosing autonomous individuals, is the heart of the problem" of a fragmented

America (p. 57). Therefore, he commends the Confucian vision, not for its possible precursors of the concept of human rights but as a viable *alternative* to American society and the world that is rapidly becoming a "global village" (p. 60). On the other hand, several papers did point to the compatibility (or not-incompatibility) of Confucian values with values of human rights, especially in light of the economic success and rise in living standards in societies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.

Seeing the human rights discourse as "the contemporary embodiment of the Enlightenment spirit" and providing "the minimum requirements and basic conditions for human flourishing," Tu Weiming is hopeful that Confucian and East Asian values will contribute to a more sophisticated cultural appreciation of the human rights discourse (p. 297). Before that can happen or any effective critique of Enlightenment values can take place, he avers, Confucian and East Asian values will need to "transform the Enlightenment mentality into a thoroughly digested cultural tradition of their own; this, in turn, is predicated on their capacity to creatively mobilize indigenous social capital and cultural assets for the task" (p. 303).

With the deep-seated legacy of anti-Confucianism that goes back eight decades to the May Fourth Movement of 1919, it is not too likely that a revival of "Confucianism" as such will happen in the People's Republic, as noted by Jeremy T. Paltiel (pp. 270–296). A political scientist as well as specialist in East Asian studies, Paltiel underscores the ambivalence and suspicion of the Chinese people, including intellectuals, toward the Confucian tradition and especially toward its bureaucratic manifestations in history. For Paltiel, "the Chinese tradition is almost always an object to be evaluated and used rather than as a continuous fountainhead of value" (p. 274). Perhaps instead of using the much-tarnished rubric of Confucianism or *Ru*, a more general one such as "Chinese Culture" (which can include the substance without the actual label of the former) may be easier to accept on the part of mainland Chinese, who have experienced almost a century of Confucian cultural iconoclasm.

Ethicist Sumner B. Twiss has contributed the valuable "Constructive Framework for Discussing Confucianism and Human Rights." His "two-level" approach (mutually agreed-upon pragmatic consensus at the international level and cultural particularity at the national level) acknowledges the complexity of moral plurality and cultural particularity. It encourages input into and the interpretation and enrichment of the human rights discourse from different cultural perspectives. As a pragmatically negotiated consensus, international human rights are, according to Twiss, "in a significant sense 'theory thin' at the international level, permitting wide diversity at the internal cultural level and mitigating the temptation to locate human rights within any one moral or political theory." Further flexibility is implied in the assumption that "all cultural traditions have the resources necessary to justify on internal grounds and in their own moral idioms,

their agreement to abide by the international human rights consensus, for this constitutes a lesser burden of justification that does not require cultural traditions to employ the conceptuality of human rights at the cultural level" (p. 38). Indeed, the Confucian input (as noted by several of the participants) was not absent, even at the very inception of the United Nation's Declaration on Human Rights in 1948.

Much credit for this volume (as for the 1995 conference itself) goes to Professor Wm. Theodore de Bary, whose preface and introduction to *Confucianism and Human Rights* provide the important overview and background, not only to the book but to the pressing issues common to China, the United States, and, by extension, the rest of the world today. His own emphasis on human rights in China is largely based on constitutionalism and building the necessary legal and institutional infrastructure of checks and balances to protect outspoken good people who seek the greater common good.[2] As also noted by Daniel W. Y. Kwok (p. 91), the Confucian tradition of benevolence on the part of authorities historically seems to have lent itself to use and abuse by the powerful in the family, the community, and the state.

Subsequent to the Hawai'i meeting in 1995 there have been two others, the last held in Beijing, June 15–17, 1998, under the sponsorship of the International Confucian Association. The important dialogue continues. While the focus of *Confucianism and Human Rights* is on China and its cultural tradition, the specificity and rigor of the book shed much light on the general ongoing discourse on human rights and the actual and potential contribution of particular cultures toward enriching the growing understanding of this issue.

In short, cooperation, exchange, and mutuality can indeed be the dominant themes between future civilizations instead of the inevitable clash which some people (like Samuel P. Huntington)[3] are prone to predict.

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NOTES

1. Frank Ching, "U.S.-China Ties Make Headway," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 April 1998.

2. See Wm. Theodore de Bary, *Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), where he explicates the work of Confucianist Huang Zhongxi (1610–1695) of the early Ming, as well as others. His forthcoming volume *Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) expresses his views on human rights more fully than in the volume reviewed here.

3. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).