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Tu Wei-ming, editor. *China in Transformation*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994. xxviii, 253 pp. Paperback \$14.00.

China in Transformation is a fascinating and timely book which brings together twelve scholars from very different specialties—philosophy, history, literature, law, sociology, anthropology, political science, and religion—to analyze the complexities and possibilities of China’s future. As the preface tells us, this is a special time for China. As in many post-Communist countries, the old order is passing, but what will replace it? How will the political, economic, and cultural reorganization of the post-Cold War world act itself out in China? Will there be the chaos of post-Leninist Europe, a peaceful evolution to capitalist democracy, or a new chauvinism that borders on fascism?

As the authors in this volume wisely caution, there are no answers yet for these questions, and it is noteworthy that some of the most commonly used words in the volume are “ambiguity,” “entanglement,” and “chaos.” Indeed, though each of the contributions here is unique, there are certain themes that run throughout. Many authors look to the past for times of upheaval in Chinese history, especially the end of the Qing dynasty, for clues to how present struggles will progress. Some of the writers are looking for the unity of the Middle Kingdom, and some for space within the Chinese identity. The organization of the text is conducive to the discussion of these and other issues because many of the essays play off preceding ones.

This collection, which is reprinted from *Dædelus* (vol. 122, no. 2 [Spring 1993] and no. 3 [Summer 1993]), is important not only for its strengths, but because its weaknesses also raise enduring questions about the utility of framing an analysis in terms of Chinese studies. As the titles of some of the essays suggest, the project of Chinese studies seems to be founded upon discourses of the uniqueness of the Chinese culture, which is described as an authentic unity of soul, core, mind, face, and so on. Against this unity of Chinese civilization is posed another ahistorical stereotype of the “modern West,” which is *naturally* democratic, capitalist, and scientific.

Yet, as many of the essays attest in the subtext of their research, most of the “modern” influence on China has been indirect, first through Japan in the nineteenth century, and now through overseas Chinese in the late twentieth century. Still, many of these same essays refuse to address the complexity of this influence, and thus set up a series of straw men and romanticized civilizations. This is particularly odd since, in the past twenty years, “the West,” “democracy,” “capitalism,” and especially “science” have been deconstructed and denaturalized in many ways. I will follow this romanticizing project while summarizing each of the

essays, and come back to it again when discussing the last chapter, because Benjamin Schwartz most directly confronts the problems of analysis according to such categories.

Tu Wei-ming's "Introduction: Cultural Perspectives" summarizes the issues and how the essays address them. The main issue for Tu is the Chinese identity crisis, and the task is to restore the national character in a way that avoids "xenophobic chauvinism or contentious separatism." This will be difficult because there has been a "collapse of social solidarity and the absence of a sense of direction" brought about by the confusing combination of economic promise and political despair (pp. xx, xiv). It is a new and challenging problem, Tu maintains, and to creatively address it, "We need to develop a new conceptual framework" to meet China's unique circumstances. Tu criticizes the present conceptual framework, but he seems to inhabit its categories and concepts quite comfortably: for example, with "democracy" Tu sounds more like an official political scientist than a philosopher when he defines it as elections, not participation.

Yet, as in the last volume from *Dædelus*, Tu's introduction is hard to analyze because it is more a manifesto than an academic argument. He writes boldly but sometimes brashly by setting up straw men like *Pax Americana* and "classical liberalism," while speaking not of China but enthusiastically of the Sinic world. Though this may be a rallying cry among Chinese scholars in the United States, the possibility of a new empire makes many in Southeast Asia, including the overseas Chinese like Lee Kuan Yew, very nervous. In other words, not only cynics are suspicious of such a Sinic world.

Edward Friedman's "A Failed Chinese Modernity" uses the discourse of patriotism to call such civilizational pride into question. Like many of the essayists here, Friedman frames his analysis in comparison with the European post-Communist states and the crisis of legitimation that each faces: "Rulers in Beijing fear losing control. Yet, they have already lost command of the categories and narratives that give meaning to a desirable future" (p. 13). They have lost control of the discourse because the Maoist patriotism that was based on anti-imperialist nationalism is no longer compelling. The leaders in Beijing hope that mass money-making, spurred by economic reforms, will absorb the political energies of China's people. Yet a new nationalism is appearing, one which is not necessarily democratic. Actually, Friedman writes that some see democracy as another foreign imposition, and that the authentic Chinese identity is patriarchal, nativistic, and authoritarian. This encourages a bitter proto-Fascist chauvinism that is expansive and militaristic.

What are the alternatives? Friedman does a great job of questioning the official nationalism by putting it into a more complex dynamic, where identifications are also cultural, regional, linguistic, and religious. Friedman deconstructs the Chinese identity into competing regional schools from the North and the

South. While Mao's nationalism was based on that of the Northern inland peasants, exemplified by Yan'an, the new nationalism looks south to the coast for trade. The official nationalism is criticized as isolationist patriotism, and its model Northern peasants are seen as "backward xenophobes."

Furthermore, this North/South distinction precedes the Yan'an model. According to turn-of-the-century views expressed by "Southern patriots," the North was a traitorous foreign dynasty allied with British imperialism against popular rebellion. The North was not seen in terms of the peasantry, but in terms of parasitic bureaucrats: "The ancient North is reimagined as China's Confucian essence, the core of the rise of Pacific Asia" (p. 12). The South, Friedman writes, is "individually free and communally rooted with the humane openness to all the world, and at one with individualistic Taoism." So rather than a unified identity, Friedman splits apart the latest hegemonic discourse of "Confucian Capitalism" into a struggle between the Confucian Northerners and the Daoist Southern traders.

In concert with Friedman, Helen F. Siu conducts a rich analysis of Southern identity in "Cultural Identity and the Politics of Difference in South China." To open up space for this project, Siu defines culture as an open process of fluid and negotiated qualities. Chinese identity is a

multi-layered and politically engaging political narrative in which three elements intertwine but are individually pursued: *minzu*, a cultural definition of being Chinese; *guojia*, the idea of legitimate governance with binding obligations for a population; and *zhengfu*, the apparatus of governance. (p. 22)

Thus Siu calls into question Beijing's exclusive control of nationalism, and sees Southern identity as "part of modern China in the making" (p. 27).

Historically, the North's control over South China, which Siu takes to be Guangdong Province, is something relatively new. Until recently, South China has developed on its own terms, and Siu does a great job of describing the merchant-clan culture of the Pearl River Delta and its latest expression in the multiracial merchant culture of Hong Kong. Against this vibrant background, the North's official identity is largely administrative, and Siu states that when there is a power vacuum, that identity will disappear: "South China has the potential to break away" (p. 21).

But an autonomous South China is not what Beijing fears most. The mandarins in the North fear being overrun, for South China is assuming a disproportionate significance in the national economy. Or more to the point, the Southerners are beginning to exert political and cultural power with their own form of Chinese patriotism. The problem for the North is that when "local elites take their Chineseness too seriously and compete to control the political center . . . [p]atriots and subversives are often the same group of people" (pp. 26, 37). Thus Siu presents a strong Southern Chinese identity that makes nationalism a fruitful ambiguity.

When most people think of Chinese courtrooms, they imagine show trials where the state uses legal procedures instrumentally to criminalize the political opposition. While recognizing this hegemonic use of law, William P. Alford's "Double-edged Swords Cut Both Ways: Law and Legitimacy in the People's Republic of China" points to the new phenomenon of dissidents creatively using the same tools against the state to show the "interplay of legality and power in . . . authoritarian societies" (p. 46). Alford deftly reconstructs four cases where five people—Wang Meng, Dai Qing, Guo Luoji, Wang Juntao, and Chen Ziming—brought suit against organs and officials of their government and the Communist Party. Each of these people knew their cases would "have scant chance of being adjudicated on the merits, let alone resolved in their favor" (p. 57). But, Alford points out, their motives were to show the hypocrisy of the legal system, give voice to vital concerns, and focus attention on abuses of power by the government and party. In this way they resemble the traditional "virtuous official confronting corrupted authority in the name of higher ideals" (p. 59).

The new twist for "virtuous officials" is that since 1978 the law courts have provided another avenue for challenge. The logic of this protest relies on the fact that the post-Cultural Revolution government has highlighted its legal development as a way of adding to its legitimacy.

In essence, the regime has not only through its law provided a legal, moral, and political vocabulary with which those who wish to take it to task might articulate their concerns, but also, by developing its court system, has proffered these individuals a singular platform from which their concerns might be broadcast. (p. 62)

These cases seek to undercut this legitimacy by graphically demonstrating, as Guo puts it, the "unwritten law behind the law." Of course, to purists in Chinese philosophy, it is the unwritten rules which are more authentically Chinese. Still, this essay shows how resistance to the state expresses itself in unexpected ways.

To understand the forces pushing and pulling at China, in "To Reform a Revolution: Under the Righteous Mandate," Wang Gungwu looks at how change itself is conceptualized in China. To do this he writes an excellent history of the use of *geming* (revolution) and *gaige* (reform), relating these terms to both ancient and twentieth-century meanings. Wang's research demonstrates how difficult it is to use the terms of one civilization to describe another, because the very modern terms *revolution* and *reform* have ancient cultural baggage: "[I]n Chinese, they both have ancient roots that are evocative and layered with meanings which have persisted to this day" (p. 74).

Geming, for example, was first used 2,500 years ago to describe the victories of Tang, the founder of the Shang dynasty, and Wu, the founder of Zhou. It is intimately intertwined with *tianming* (Mandate of Heaven), hence Wang combines the heavenly and secular to gloss *geming* as "the tradition of violent but righteous

(Heavenly) mandate” (p. 73). This term was popularized again in the Japanese press when it characterized Sun Yat-sen after the failure of the 1895 Guangzhou uprising as a *gemingzhe* (revolutionary). Yet, Wang maintains, there was still an ambiguity between *geming* as the traditional “overthrowing [of a] dynasty that had lost its Heavenly Mandate” and the modern “replacing a political system that was no longer viable, by force of arms if necessary” (p. 76). This ambiguity changed with the Bolshevik Revolution and the May Fourth Movement, where the struggle for discursive control over the “revolution” was fought between nationalism and socialism until the Communist victory in 1949.

Reform in terms of *gaige*, on the other hand, refers to a dynasty renewing and strengthening itself, for example the Self-Strengthening Campaign of 1894 and the One Hundred Days Reform in 1898. Like the modern Dengist reforms, *gaige* assumes that the political structure is not the issue, and that all change will proceed through peaceful means. Wang examines the meaning of *gaige* in terms of economic reform, population reform, and intellectual reform, bringing up important points such as questioning whether the “One-Child Policy” is actually a revolution from the Confucian concept of family. Political reform contains a dangerous ambiguity, and can easily be confused with *geming*, or worse (in the eyes of the Beijing elite), with “peaceful evolution.”

One drawback of this essay is that it divides up reform and revolution according to standard categories of peaceful versus violent means. Tragically, we have a movement that calls this description into question. In 1989, protesters used self-consciously nonviolent means for what the authorities called “counter-revolution.” Likewise, the government used extreme violence, as Li Peng now tells us, to defend the reforms. It would be interesting to see how Wang would categorize these two groups in terms of *geming* and *gaige*. Or to put it another way, it seems quite odd that Tiananmen Square is so invisible in a discussion of reform and revolution.

In contrast to the writers of the many speculative manifestos included in this volume, Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjian Shi ground their essay “Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China: Findings from a Survey” in a quantitative analysis of the first national survey of Chinese political behavior and attitudes. Nathan and Shi frame the utility of survey research well by arguing that the purpose of interpretative studies is to highlight the uniqueness of a given culture. The survey approach, on the other hand, sees political culture as the distribution of values, attitudes, and beliefs toward politics among a population, and can lead to comparisons within and across groups.

Nathan and Shi, following the lead of standard political culture surveys, frame their analysis of Chinese political culture in terms of three questions addressing, respectively, Political Impact, Political Efficacy, and Political Tolerance. While interpretative studies often conclude that “Chinese political culture is . . . an obstacle to the realization of democratic aspirations” (p. 95), Nathan and Shi’s

research “show[s] that while some of the attitudes associated with democracy are less prevalent in China than in some other countries, Chinese political culture today is neither especially traditional [n]or especially totalitarian” (p. 98). Actually, their findings might have been more revealing if not for the phrasing of the question about political tolerance. While in other countries survey researchers used a vague question about tolerance for people “espousing revolution,” Chinese were asked about tolerance for those who “sympathize with the Gang of Four.” Since the Chinese question refers not to a general process, but evokes quite recent historical and personal experiences, I think it is not as useful. Nathan and Shi recognize the problems with this version of the question, but for political reasons could not ask the more general question about revolution. This, then, is not a problem of translation—as Wang’s essay argues—but a problem of academic freedom. Indeed, this tells us more about political tolerance in the state than in the populace. The acute differences in time also lead one to question the comparative conclusions: while the Chinese were surveyed in 1990, the data from other countries is from 1959–1960 and 1985.

In their conclusion, Nathan and Shi bring up the ideological and methodological problems of Chinese Studies. They are self-conscious about their quantitative research, explaining its important differences from what they call “interpretive studies” in a clear way for nonspecialists (although I must say that they thus did a great job in *interpreting* the data). They argue against cultural uniqueness, for the “data show China’s culture to be distinctive, but only distributionally, not categorically” (p. 116). Indeed, an important aspect of this essay is that it goes beyond “intellectual histories,” which are all too often taken as synonymous with “Chinese history,” to sample “Chinese public opinion,” which includes what the farmers might be thinking about.

In “The Radicalization of China in the Twentieth Century,” Ying-shih Yü delineates the Chinese mind in the twentieth century, primarily in terms of a process of radicalization. This radicalization comes from a fundamental shift of criticism from a concern with things internal to China, to the challenge of external—that is, “Western”—influences. Yü argues, as do many others, that up until the nineteenth century, intellectual critique in China was “interpretation”: though each of the contending schools had different ways of defining the Dao, they all took the centrality of the Dao for granted. After the Opium Wars, criticism was largely external in nature. Rather than interpreting the Dao, there was a “discovery” of Western values and technology. This shift was not clean, and many of the reform movements of the late nineteenth century were actually “discovery disguised as interpretation.” It was only with the May Fourth Movement that criticism was framed in terms of discovery, which discarded traditional culture.

Yü’s second argument is that radicalization is linked directly to the marginization of China in the modern world and of intellectuals in Chinese society. Chinese civilization was used to being at the center of the universe, but after

the 1840s it was displaced, as Benedict Anderson writes, from the Middle Kingdom to the Far East.¹ This identity crisis forced the Chinese to criticize radically their traditional ways. Such a self-examination is part of the second element of radicalization, for it was the marginalization of the scholar-official (*shi*) as intellectual (*zhishifenzi*) that opened up new necessities and radical challenges for scholars in China. When the scholar-officials were transformed into intellectuals, they lost their direct link to state power, and thus were more susceptible to radicalization.

This second point also highlights the weaknesses of Yü's method of analysis. Once again, it is taking intellectual history as Chinese history. This is a dangerous slip that actually adds to the anti-intellectualism prevalent in China today. Furthermore, Yü's essay is a prime example of the romanticization of both "China" and the "West" that ignores the place of Japan in this radical dynamic as well as the crucial complexities of these societies. For example, although the "interpretation/discovery" dichotomy is useful, it explains neither the challenge of Buddhism in China, nor the movements of "interpretation" that are now dominating the Western academies. Also an editorial point is in order: Yü's use of both Wade-Giles and pinyin is cumbersome.

Myron L. Cohen's "Cultural and Political Inventions in Modern China: The Case of the Chinese 'Peasant'" makes an important shift from intellectuals to see how farmers have been discursively and thus ideologically transformed into peasants. He draws upon this theme to connect China with problems common to Communist states where political legitimacy is based on the creation of a new socialist society, a new culture, and a new kind of person. This cultural construction of the "new" necessitates the parallel construction of a totally objectionable "old regime" to be transformed (p. 151). Cohen points out that the construction of the "old regime" in China was not just the project of Communists; the rejection of "tradition" was shared by non-Communists as well in the early twentieth century.

Cohen calls this construction into question by analyzing how the rural population was worked into this revolutionary equation. Strangely enough, this Chinese ideology was a reversal of intellectual trends in Europe, where social revolution turned peasants into farmers. In China, rural areas were redefined as backward, and the "old society" was invented by transforming farmers into peasants, tradition into feudalism, and customs and religion into superstition. This discursively negative perception of peasants came from loan words. But they did not come directly from English, French, or German, but through the mediation of Meiji era Japanese, which drew upon classical Chinese texts to translate works from the West.

The problem with these new concepts, and with the urban/rural distinction in general, is that they did not adequately represent the rural experience and that they distort Chinese economic life in important ways. Since there was no distinc-

tion between city and countryside in cultural tradition, the city was not by definition superior, and “peasant” was not a term of contempt. Still these terms came into play with the various social revolutions of the twentieth century. With the passage of forty-five years since the revolution, peasant identity is largely administrative, and thus there are now “peasant entrepreneurs.”

To explain the problem with seeing the rural population in terms of “peasants,” Cohen analyzes the rural political economy and argues that upon examination, the distinction between farming and market-dominated relationships breaks down. Rather than focus on the peasant to make sense of the political-economic relations both traditionally and in the 1990s, we need to use the family as the major economic actor.

Cohen finishes his essay by tracing the continued dominance of the ideology of the peasant. It persists not with farmers, but with the urban elites, who feel that “populism and popular democracy are utterly unacceptable if China was to avoid chaos and achieve national strength” (p. 155). Both sides at Tiananmen were suspicious of farmers’ political participation.

In “A Search for China’s Soul,” Tongqi Lin gives a thorough reading of literary and social texts to examine China’s soul, which is in a state of “momentous social and spiritual transformation” (p. 179). Lin frames this search as a “humanist quest” of self-realization and a quest for cultural identity, and gives fruitful examples of contemporary struggles with subjectivity. One problem with this essay is that even though Lin is using critical theory and posits meaning as multilayered, he still uncritically uses sacred unities like the “soul.” It would also be interesting to see how people use *hun* (soul) differently now than they did in other times and places.

Perry Link, in “China’s ‘Core’ Problem,” looks at some of these same issues in terms of the struggle of Chinese intellectuals to find a “core” of Chineseness in the current economic boom, which relies on foreign investment and technology. The core used to be Confucius, and then it was Mao. But now both of these have been repudiated, and many are looking for a new “point of purchase,” perhaps a civil society which can satisfy the “yearning for distinctive moral-social-political core” (p. 196). Link gives some examples of a core, including “*An Old Method*,” “*Four Little Dragons*,” “*Four Basic Principles*,” “*People of Strong Will*,” and “*Backed by a Strong China*.” Each of these formulations comes from a very different Chinese experience, yet they “all share a deep reverence for China, a concept of its uniqueness, and a wish to be proud of it” (p. 200). This uniqueness means that China needs to be outstanding: “Many Chinese today, while repudiating Mao completely, continue to feel vaguely but profoundly that something is askew if China cannot be a good example” (p. 194).

Right now, Link feels that “making money” is the main ideology, and this works for several reasons, including the benefits of prosperity, the Chinese cul-

tural penchant for family-based enterprise, and an economic freedom that is more freedom than previously enjoyed. One question raised by this essay is why did Link put “core” in quotation marks, when he is not questioning the existence or the necessity of any core: he does not ask whether China’s “core problem” is simply that some people feel that it *needs* to have a core.

In “Yan’an and the Narrative Reconstruction of Reality,” David E. Apter does a brilliant discourse analysis to show the interplay between Mao Zedong’s stories, history, theory, ideology and self-fulfilling prophecies. The purpose here is not to judge the truth value of Mao’s stories, and thus perhaps discard them as propaganda, but to see stories in terms of symbolic capital as an alternative to more conventional modes of power.

Apter uses three playful terms to guide his analysis of the narrativity of Mao’s famous stories. “Mytho-logic” describes the logic of stories in building the myth of the Communist Party, and thus the self-fulfilling prophecies of its power. Storytelling is an old tradition in China, and Mao’s mytho-logic draws on both the oral sources of the peasants and literary sources such as *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and *The Water Margin* to tell the story of the revolution.

With his stories at Yan’an, Mao was transformed from an essentially military figure into a “cosmocratic” one. These stories were never just stories, but always woven into an argument both as interpretative devices and as a means to point to a future. Indeed, Mao is a much better storyteller than theorizer. As Stuart Schram notes, Mao’s theoretical essays are the most hollow and wooden.

The third neologism, “*writ-ualization*,” refers to how Mao transcribed events into social texts by contextualizing them. Apter notes that “virtually every speech of Mao’s began with a narrative” (p. 224). Indeed, these peasant stories cut across hierarchies, bridging the gap between the illiterate and the literate, to integrate “the masses” into the (narrative/conspiratory) plot of the revolution.

Apter concludes that it was the workings of such narratives that added to the mythical political power of Mao and the Communist Party:

Such storytelling enabled the Communists to convert every defeat, retreat, and crisis point into a victory of some sort, a slight of hand, in which disasters become magical occasions, and failures superhuman accomplishments, a kind of magic realism matched by ruthlessness. But in the end, such fictive truths became self-fulfilling prophecies, enabling the Communists to become virtually miraculous in their own eyes. Yet to call such storytelling *fabrication* in the sense of lying is to trivialize it. (p. 229)

Rather than trivialize such a manufacture of truth, Apter encourages us to examine how other truths, both sacred and profane, are also constructed in projects like Chinese studies.

There are two interrelated weaknesses in this essay. The theoretical argument is a little too thick for the nonspecialist academic, and not enough examples are

given. To remedy both problems Apter needs—if not here, then in a future work—to use some of Mao’s stories (and his deconstruction of them), as well as to let us in on the extensive interviews cited in the acknowledgments section that were conducted with “survivors” from Yan’an.

Perhaps as an answer to Tu’s question on finding a new theoretical framework, the final essay, “Culture, Modernity and Nationalism—Further Reflections,” was added to the volume from a later edition of *Dædelus*. Benjamin I. Schwartz does not provide a new theoretical framework, but gives a healthy critique of the concepts—Culture, Modernity, and Nationalism—that both Chinese and non-Chinese rely on to write about China. Though it is fashionable simply to dismiss them as “foreign categories” irrelevant to the Chinese situation, I think that would be misguided. As we have seen in the Japanese influence on Chinese writing, it really should not be more than a historical issue whether they were originally Chinese or not. These concepts have been in play for over one hundred years, so a more valuable topic would be to examine how these and their attendant mytho-logics are used to create truths about things like the Chinese “peasant.”

Rather than discard things like Culture, Modernity, and Nationalism, Schwartz is calling on scholars to loosen up these often stiff categories. In other words, use them as analytical tools, not as keys to a sacred soul. Thus Schwartz is very critical of those who treat these terms “as closed totalities or wholes that subsume a wide variety of themes and components . . . [like] two physical objects that cannot occupy the same space” (p. 233). He cautions us against the urge in comparative studies to find meaning only in uniqueness and “otherness.” As Nathan and Shi put it, “Both distinctiveness and nondistinctiveness of cultures are not facts about cultures, but artifacts of the ways in which cultures are studied” (p. 118).

Schwartz argues that far from being unique and incommensurable, cultures are often easily comparable to the components of other structures. Thus Schwartz also takes exception to those who see Chinese culture in monolithic, usually Confucian terms. What about Buddhism, Zhuangzi, and Mozi, who offered quite different visions of Chinese life, he asks. Rather, Schwartz sees culture in terms of persistent dominant orientations which “produce not an integrated harmony but ongoing problematiques” (p. 235). These dominant orientations are not incommensurable with those of other cultures: Schwartz contends that Confucius and Aristotle do in fact discuss communicable issues. Schwartz questions modernity and nationalism in similar ways, pointing out the glaring gaps in the hegemonic discourses and how they are used. If you can get around Schwartz’ jabs at things like postmodernism and cultural diversity, it makes for a thought-provoking essay.

This is the strength of the whole volume, for the essays call each other into question and lead to discussion, if not in seminars and classrooms, at least in the book margins. As I have pointed out in this review, one of the thoughts that the

subtexts of this volume provokes is whether the problem is a search for a “core” itself, followed by a necessity to compare it with something wholly other. The tension is not just between China and the West, but also between China and Japan, overseas Chinese and mainland Chinese, and Chinese intellectuals and (the rest of the) Chinese people.

One way to get around this radical Self/Other research is to do comparisons not only with polar opposites but also with societies that share important experiences. The volume started this by making fascinating comparisons with post-Communist states. Yet though they are useful, they are also quite vague, and are used only to set up the internal Chinese analysis. It is interesting that no essay was included which compared the Chinese experience with the development experiences of Japan, or any other Asian, colonized, or Third World nation. One solution to the problems of Chinese studies is to get outside the logic of Chinese studies and, for example, make such intra-Asian comparisons as well. Friedman and Siu’s essays provide a great start, for their regional analysis of Chinese identity has important parallels in Vietnam, where the Northern Confucian/Southern merchant society is undergoing similar strains.

Tu is right on when he declares that “[w]e need to develop a new conceptual framework,” and I hope the next volume of this set is called “Chinese Studies in Transformation.” The essayists here have already gotten off to a great start. There are many other important themes in this vibrant volume, and I encourage readers to see for themselves what this project contains.

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- NOTES
1. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1991), p. 70 n. 6.