



 The MIT Press

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Source: *Daedalus*, Vol. 121, No. 2, The Exit from Communism (Spring, 1992), pp. 251-292

Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20025441>

Accessed: 10-05-2019 02:54 UTC

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Intellectual Effervescence in China¹

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE UNION of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the reintegration of the European Community pose intriguing questions about the new world order. The apparent triumph of the market economy and democratic polity may suggest that the bitter struggle between capitalism and socialism is ending. The emergence of a victorious West signals the end of the Cold War. The simple military victory in the Gulf War may have enhanced the impression that the United States, the unrivaled leader of the Western world, is now the most powerful shaper of the new world order. Yet, the euphoria that a real *Pax Americana* is upon us was short-lived. Prevailing in American academic institutions, politics, and business is a critical awareness that, despite our military power, our ability to organize a safe, just, and benevolent United States is sapped. The solemn realization that there are no quick fixes for our problems in education, economy, crime, drugs, race relations, welfare, child care, and health instills a strong sense of vulnerability, if not helplessness, in our national psyche. The questions of our own physical and mental well-being, our willingness to take care of the poor, the aged, and the less fortunate, our desire to free ourselves and our loved ones from drugs and crime, our concern for minority rights, our commitment to providing for the young and the innocent, our ability to revitalize our means of production, and our determination to effectively teach basic subjects (English and mathematics) in elementary and secondary schools loom large in our hearts and minds. Underlying these worries about things at hand is a powerful

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logic that unless we put our own house in order, it is presumptuous and foolhearted for us to talk about global leadership.

LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND GLOBAL CONSCIOUSNESS

However, while we recognize that superior military technology cannot be readily applied to other areas vital to our security and prosperity, such as the reduction of racial tension and the improvement of secondary education, we take it for granted that our form of life represents the most advanced stage of human flourishing to date. Our faith in the self-generating and ever-expanding dynamism of the economy may have been lost, but our position as the most voluminous producer in the world still allows us the greatest capacity to define the parameters of international trade. Our trust in political leadership may have declined at both state and national levels, but our conviction that the American system of government is a source of inspiration for all aspiring democracies has not been shaken. Moreover, while the idea of the “melting pot” may be outmoded, our assumption that American society is the most hospitable and opportune for immigrants is still valid. We fully acknowledge that the spread of American mass culture is at best a mixed blessing, but we strongly believe that what America symbolizes in cultural terms is innovation rather than stagnation, freedom rather than oppression, greater equality rather than injustice.

Surely, the rights of the individual, free enterprise, the market system, equal opportunity, competition in the private sector, progressive taxation, and self-reliance are all integral parts of the American belief system. Still, Americans believe in more than market economy. The American belief in “personal mobility and the free flow of ideas,” in “an openness of spirit and a range of possibility unheard of anywhere at anytime in history,” and in “the proposition that self-government was possible among monarchies and dictatorships”² remains a standard of inspiration for the rest of the world. The tacit assumption of the American public that what we have is what the overwhelming majority of the human race wants and strives to achieve is not groundless.

The modernizing process that originated in Western Europe and reached its apex in North America in recent decades has been the most powerful facilitator of universalization and homogenization the

world has ever witnessed. Virtually all major spheres of interest characteristic of contemporary civilization are indebted to this process: science, technology, transportation, mass communication, market economy, democratic institutions, multinational corporations, and research universities, just to mention a few. The values that underlie these spheres of interest, notably liberties, human rights, and due process of law, are also rooted in the Enlightenment of the modern West. The American way, as the paradigmatic unfolding of Westernization, is often perceived as the wave of the future for humanity as a whole.

A persistent theme in the American way is the affirmation of ordinary life. As an astute Chinese thinker observed some time ago, although the United States has yet to produce great philosophers, its constitutional framers, guided by pragmatic idealism, established an awe-inspiring political system unprecedented in its ability to adapt to new circumstances without losing sight of its inner identity and consistency. Indeed, "the genius of the Founders was to construct a system in which participation could be broadened and each generation could create America anew."³ This idea of the American way as a joint venture, a great experiment, may have undermined its Puritan roots, but what it symbolizes is, at least on the surface, in accord with what Charles Taylor proposes:

The notion that there is a certain dignity and worth in this life requires a contrast; no longer, indeed, between this life and some "higher" activity like contemplation, war, active citizenship, or heroic asceticism, but now lying between different ways of living the life of production and reproduction. The notion is never *whatever* we do is acceptable. This would be unintelligible as the basis for a notion of dignity. Rather the key point is that the higher is to be found not outside of but as a *manner of living ordinary life*.⁴

Specifically, what the American way demonstrates is a mode of human flourishing that is a fulfillment of rather than a departure from ordinary life. The modest American dream of owning a comfortable car and a spacious house, earning a fair wage, and enjoying the freedom of movement, travel, assembly, speech, and privacy seems reasonable as a legitimate modern demand. We would expect that people in Bonn, Paris, and London, in fact Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Hong Kong, and Singapore, even Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi see the reasonableness of this modest American dream.

Obviously, the caveat is how costly this seemingly legitimate modern demand has been and how incredibly difficult it is to imagine the plausibility, let alone the realizability, of this dream in a global context. The dramatic changes throughout the world do not at all bear out the truthfulness of our vision. Rather, they compel us to reflect upon the precariousness of our situation. The disintegration of the USSR shows *inter alia* the need for much more sophisticated conceptual resources than we currently have in economics, political science, sociology, and cultural studies to understand, not to mention provide guidance for, the emergence of a new geopolitical universe loaded with deadly weapons and destructive forces. The reintegration of the European Community clearly signals a new pattern of competitiveness in international trade and world politics. If we broaden our scope to recognize other parts of the world, the inadequacy of our model for modernity becomes even more obvious. We do well to put our own house in order, for, needless to say, it is increasingly unrealistic for even a fraction of our fellow Americans, including our sons and daughters, to live up to the modest American dream.

As we extend our vision beyond the horizon of our local knowledge, the untenability of our manner of living ordinary life becomes abundantly clear. The sense of crisis confronting our human community, occasioned not only by the internecine warfare flaring up here and there but also by the steady depletion of natural resources and the seemingly irreversible decline of our life-support system, raises serious doubts about our viability as a species. This indisputable fact alone evokes the distinct sensation that we are but fellow travelers in an endangered lifeboat. The graphic vision of the blue earth in the vast uncharted sea of galaxies is no longer an imagined possibility but a lived reality continuously ingrained in our mind's eye by the stunningly beautiful pictures taken by astronauts. For the first time in human history, we can claim that we know comprehensively the boundaries of our habitat, including the thickness of the air surrounding our planet. And we observe in awe the fullness and vulnerability of our common property. It is a salutary lesson to learn that our reasonable quest for a legitimate modern style of living has made us individually and collectively the most dangerous polluter, the most irresponsible squanderer, and the most wasteful spender of natural and human resources the world has ever encountered.

It is not at all surprising that part of our Western heritage is being relegated to the background. The Faustian drive to explore, conquer, and subdue has lost much of its persuasive force as our ecological knowledge enhances our sensitivity to the need for a harmonious human relationship with nature. In light of the newly emerging concerns for biodiversity and the environment, the tacitly accepted ideology for unlimited progress informed by such doctrines as social Darwinism with its pernicious anthropocentric competitiveness is no longer convincing or even reasonable. The utilitarian application of instrumental rationality and the Marxist advocacy of the humanization of nature have both led to unintended negative consequences for the human habitat. Even the biblical assertion that we “have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth”⁵ is called into question. The sanctity of the earth as a supreme value looms large in interreligious dialogue, and the Green movement has been gaining strength worldwide.

The recognition that we are embedded earthlings, that our ordinary secular life is sacred, and that the ultimate meaning of human existence is to be realized through our practical daily living offers us a fresh perspective on the human condition. The lower life of “sloth, irrationality, slavery, or alienation,” as instructed by the reformers, classical utilitarians, abolitionists, or Marxists, still serves as a negative example in our ethics.⁶ The higher life, the admirable good life, must now be informed by a new vision, a vision that was not even a rejected possibility in theology, instrumental rationality, Enlightenment mentality, or dialectical materialism a few decades ago. The rich texture of our ethical reflection, interwoven by local knowledge and global consciousness, provides a complex background for understanding intellectual effervescence in socialist China.

MODERNIZATION AS A CONTESTED DISCOURSE

Talcott Parsons in the 1970s defined modernity in terms of three inseparable dimensions: the market economy, democratic polity, and individualism.⁷ In retrospect, we may interpret the Parsonian thesis as based on a questionable assumption, namely, that the genetic reasons for West European and North American societies to become modern were prematurely identified. The structural reason for their moder-

nity was converted by Parsons into a universal category. Indeed, Parsons may have had only the United States in mind when he specified these three dimensions as the defining characteristics of modernity. Thus, what the United States actually achieved in its modern transformation was generalized as an “ideal type” for other societies to emulate. It may be important to note also that the kind of America that informed Parsons was a cultural construct laden with ideological implications of the liberal-democratic persuasion. The contrast with the socialist system is too sharp to be accidental: planned economy, centralized polity, and collectivism. Modernity, in this sense, is neither traditional nor socialist. Rather it is capitalist America defined in liberal-democratic terms.

We could of course take a cynical view, as the French intellectual Pierre Nora did when he wrote about structural functionalism, still very much in vogue in the United States at the time; he said: “In sociology, Talcott Parsons and his school seemed to be raising a monument to American self-justification, a theory of social harmony, a closed system of social and national integration.”⁸ However, this Parsonian determination to present an American vision of modernization is predicated on a comparative civilizational perspective succinctly articulated by S. N. Eisenstadt:

The processes of modernization are, therefore, unique in comparison with other historical movements of change, because they have been grounded on the assumption that it is possible to create a new sociopolitical order, an order based on premises of universalism and equality. The spread of these attitudes has led to far-reaching changes in societal structure and organization, especially in the economic and political spheres. Modernization has taken place throughout the world through a series of social, political, and cultural movements that, unlike movements of change and rebellion in many other historical situations, have tended to combine orientations of protest and those of center-formation and institution-building. It has fostered the establishment of a universal civilization in which different societies have served one another as mutual reference points. A society judges both itself and others in relation to these premises of universalism and equality.⁹

Parsons may have been idiosyncratic in defining modernization in parochial American terms, but, in light of Eisenstadt’s insight, the Parsonian reading of the specific features of “these premises of universalism and equality” is still heuristically significant.

The disintegration of the USSR and the reintegration of the European Community, easily perceived as the failure of communism and the triumph of capitalism, seem to suggest that Parsons' advocacy of the American way is right after all. Planned economy must be replaced by market economy, centralized bureaucracy must be superseded by democratic polity and, by implication, collectivism must be supplanted by individualism. However, the displacement of socialism by capitalism as an inevitable consequence of modernization, defined in American terms, is too neat to be true. For one thing, Eisenstadt's "universalism and equality" do not at all specify the American way as the only means to fulfill these premises. The question of "tradition" as a resource as well as a constraint in the modernizing process features prominently in Eisenstadt's conception of modernizing nations serving as "mutual reference points" to one another.

The Western European situation is quite illustrative in this sense. Revolutionary France, obsessed with her language and culture, tradition-bound England, and nationalist Germany signify such different approaches to modernization; they suggest that the message of the modern Western Enlightenment is pregnant with fruitful ambiguities. "Liberty, equality, and fraternity," for example, do not cohere as an integrated value system recommending a coordinated ethical course of action. In both theory and practice, liberty and equality are in conflict or, at least, in creative tension. Many liberal-minded thinkers, notably Friedrich von Hayek, are highly critical of the principle of equality, and, by implication, of democratic practices inspired by egalitarianism.¹⁰ On the other hand, the demand for welfare, ostensibly to soften the edges of free enterprise, in England and the United States has shaken the foundation of classical liberalism (which now prefers to define itself as self-referential conservatism). By contrast, strictly speaking, among the modern Western democracies, only America has developed a full-fledged civil society. This was part of the reason that Alexis de Tocqueville observed with amazement the strengths and pitfalls of democracy in America. The sense of radical otherness that he experienced in studying how the political system functioned in the United States symbolizes the diversity in Western democracy.

Notwithstanding that diversity in the modern West (in which the United States styles itself as a super-Europe), to the contemporary

Chinese intellectual, the model of modernity it offers and the process of modernization it suggests are deceptively simple. Undeniably, market economy and democratic polity have been the foci of the open-door policy in China since 1979. Deng Xiaoping's strategy of liberalizing the planned economy by a limited use of the market mechanism was at odds with his critics' insistence that political reform must be an integral part, if not a precondition, of economic reform. Wei Jingsheng, a sophisticated worker-intellectual, eloquently argued that modernizing agriculture, industry, science and technology, and military hardware (the so-called Four Modernizations), without democratization (the Fifth Modernization), was doomed to failure.¹¹ His prophetic voice angered Deng, who, frustrated by the ill-conceived military expedition against Vietnam, and humiliated by the Xidan Democracy Wall in the spring of 1979, decided to forge ahead with economic reform without much compromise on the political front. Wei was arrested and sentenced to a fifteen-year imprisonment. The schizophrenic policy of bold initiatives in economic reform and fundamentalist adherence to the Four Cardinal Principles (adherence to the socialist path, the leadership of the Communist Party, Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought, and the people's democratic dictatorship) characterized Deng's attempt to have *glasnost* without *perestroika*.

The stunning success of the agricultural reform which generated much economic dynamism in rural China, notably in the Yangtze delta and the Canton region, in the early 1980s enabled the forward-looking intellectuals (many of them high Party officials) to opt for a basic reorientation in ideology and, possibly, a fundamental restructuring of the political system. On the occasion of the centennial of Karl Marx's death (March 14, 1983), the report delivered by the highly respected scholar-official Zhou Yang openly advocated Marxist humanism and formally raised the issue of alienation in the socialist society. This so provoked orthodox ideologists such as Deng Lique and Hu Qiaomu that they persuaded Deng Xiaoping to launch a nationwide Anti-Spiritual Pollution campaign. Although the campaign itself lasted for only twenty-eight days, the oppressive ethos which stigmatized sensitive ideological and political topics continued for months.¹²

Yet, for the next four years, under the leadership of Party Secretary-General Hu Yaobang, with the support of Premier Zhao Ziyang

and, at least, the tacit consent of Deng Xiaoping, China experienced an intellectual openness unprecedented since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949. The two mountains—traditional feudalism and bourgeois imperialism—thought to have been smashed by the mighty current of Marxist-Leninist socialism reemerged as Confucian humanism and democratic liberalism. Within the Marxist circle, significantly different voices were heard as Yu Quanguan, Wang Ruoshui, Shu Shaozhi, Li Shu, and Li Honglin began to articulate their own interpretations of the socialist message.¹³ The fluidity of the marketplace of ideas was such that virtually the whole range of modern Western thought found a receptive audience in China's institutes of higher learning. Some of the most liberal-minded intellectuals staffed a few of the traditionally most vital ideological organs: for example, the "theory division" (*lilunbu*) of the *People's Daily*, the Marxist and Leninist Institute in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and the Department of Philosophy at Peking University.

The issues, heatedly debated with real policy implications in this period, included some of the most sacrosanct in the economy and polity. Commercial enterprises in socialism, the marketization of the socialist economy, the pluralization of ownership, entrepreneurship, and the privatization of property figured among the economic ones; dogmatism in Marxist thought, democratization of the Chinese Communist Party, anti-feudal dictatorship, political pluralism, election, the legitimacy of private interests, and due process of law were among the political ones.¹⁴ On December 7, 1984, the *People's Daily* startled China watchers all over the world with the editorial statement that "we cannot ask the writings of Marx and Lenin to solve *all* our current problems."¹⁵ The carefully inserted qualified "all," alleged to have been absent in the original version, did not dilute the strong impression that China was ideologically prepared to leave the socialist camp.

The Sino-British accord on Hong Kong, Beijing's perceived flexibility vis-à-vis the Taiwan question, and the major effort in sending students abroad, inviting American and European lecturers in the social sciences and humanities to deliver talks to packed auditoriums, scholarly communication with advanced industrial societies, the promotion of tourism, foreign investment, and international trade all seemed to point to a basic ideological reorientation. Given the

intellectual atmosphere, it was not farfetched to imagine then that China would be the first socialist country to make its exit from communism. Indeed, the newly arrived students from the USSR were astonished at the freedom that the Chinese students enjoyed in 1985. The Russian students observed with envy the obvious achievements in Chinese reform.¹⁶

Student demonstrations, mainly at the Science and Technology University in Hefei, provided a rare opportunity for the orthodox ideologists to close ranks and form a “united front” against Hu Yaobang in the winter of 1986. Without the approval of Deng Xiaoping and the acquiescence of Zhao Ziyang, this could not have happened. One may surmise that while Hu was convinced that a basic ideological reorientation was in order, that a fundamental restructuring of the political system was probably necessary, Zhao shared Deng’s wishful thinking that socialist China could benefit from the market economy without adopting the Western-style democratic polity. They, either by choice or by default, played into the hands of the orthodox ideologists, who by then considered Bourgeois Liberalization the most serious threat to Chinese socialism. In retrospect, student demonstrations were the result of a combination of several disparate factors: anti-Japanese patriotism, moral indignation against corruption, a demand for government accountability, dissatisfaction with their own living conditions, racist friction with foreign students (especially those from African countries), impatience with political reform, and a sense of relative deprivation as they became acquainted with styles of conspicuous consumption common in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore), not to mention Western Europe and North America.

Underlying these factors was the emergence of a new phenomenon in socialist China, readily understandable in traditional Chinese perspective, but difficult to comprehend in the context of four decades of Chinese communist rule, namely the communal critical self-consciousness of the intelligentsia. Although Hu Yaobang became the casualty of the short-lived Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization campaign in early 1987, his death two years later was “as weighty as the majestic Mount Tai.”¹⁷ The epoch-making event in the square of the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen) in the spring of 1989,

occasioned by Hu's unexpected death, was a brilliant expression of this communal critical self-consciousness.

Nevertheless, as we have noted, the implicit assumption that China's modernization had to follow the pattern characterized by the inseparability of the market economy, democratic polity, and individualism is highly problematical. It is more than a question of disaggregating the three dimensions of modernity; given the divergent paths of democratization in the modern West, the question of whether or not there is an authentic possibility of a Chinese-style democracy is very alive. In light of Eisenstadt's insight, could the premises of universalism and equality be located somewhere else besides the market economy, democratic polity, and individualism, as the Parsonian thesis specified? For instance, could fraternity as well as liberty and equality be recognized as a major focus of the modernizing effort?

COMMUNITY IN CRISIS

It is possible that modernization theory, as a view of the future, may have given a highly condensed and thus necessarily limited interpretation of the past. To the American modernists, the Enlightenment signified mainly the liberation of the human spirit, guided by instrumental rationality, for the purpose of transforming the world into an "affluent society" without ideology. The Western European Enlightenment, as Ernest Gellner notes, involves both a British style stressing empiricism and skepticism, but also a French style drawn to anticlericalism.¹⁸ Furthermore, the universalist and liberal-democratic impulse of the American modernists led them to underestimate the vital importance of perennial human institutions, notably the family, but also clan, kinship, neighborhood, and religious associations. Intent on developing a set of generalizable criteria for measuring degrees of modernization, they were also oblivious to cultural diversity.

As a result, they failed to predict the enduring presence of human networking, defined in terms of primordial ties such as ethnicity, gender, language, ancestral home, class, and religious faith, in highly industrialized societies as well as in developing countries. Racial tension in the United States, language conflict in Canada and Belgium, the struggle for indigenous people's rights in North America, feminist movements throughout the Western world, and the

ubiquitous specter of religious fundamentalism are all salient features of the modern West, but one of the implications of the modernist project is that what America symbolizes is the unlimited transformative potential for developing New Liberty, New Freedom, New Nationalism, a New Frontier, and, more recently, the Great Society, embracing a new structure of world order.

Paradoxically, the American sense of newness is deeply rooted in a historical consciousness which often invokes the promises of the Founding Fathers. When Chinese intellectuals, especially zealous university students, rediscovered America in the 1980s, they were obsessed with the future of China. As a response to the dismissal of Hu Yaobang, a six-part television series was produced by a talented team of young reformers, who straightforwardly announced the death of the Yellow River culture (which implies the backwardness of China) and advocated the moral imperative for the Chinese intelligentsia to embrace the culture of the Blue Ocean (which symbolizes the modern West). Aired twice on the nationwide network to millions of peasants, workers, soldiers as well as bureaucrats and intellectuals in 1987, *He Shang* (The River Elegy) set the cultural agenda for an unprecedented national debate: "Whither China?". The message was startlingly unambiguous: neither Confucianism nor socialism can save China; in fact, the confluence of the feudal past (Confucian authoritarianism) and the socialist present (Stalinist dictatorship) is the main reason that China has been drowning. Seasoned Westernized intellectuals were invited to embark on a rescue mission. Together with democracy-minded officials and market-oriented entrepreneurs, they could eventually be expected to form a "middle class" that would guide China toward modernity.

Tacitly encouraged by Zhao Ziyang, "The River Elegy" was a cultural essay, intended to serve the dual purpose of articulating the impatience of the young and exposing the inertia of the octogenarian orthodox ideologists. The hidden agenda, though not very well disguised, was a call for a concerted effort to work against the ossified Party apparatus by rallying around Zhao and his "think tank," all in the name of a fresh start. The angry response to the message by the old guard, led by men like General Wang Zhen, eventually forced the series to be banned; ironically, however, it helped "The River Elegy" to receive unusually high critical acclaim among intellectuals. The alienation of the intelligentsia from the power holders of the Party

became enhanced when certain very vocal critics of the Marxist orthodoxy were forced to resign their Party membership in late 1987. The bifurcation of political power and intellectual influence was an initial sign that the independence of the intelligentsia was perhaps in the offing. The conscientious reporter Liu Binyan and the judicious theoretician Wang Ruoshui became celebrities in academic, intellectual, and cultural circles as soon as word circulated that they had been ostracized from the Party. Deng Liquan, in contrast, had difficulty recruiting writers for his ideological team, despite his direct access to power at the center.

In a political culture with a strong civil society tradition, in which the adversarial system is prominent, the bifurcation of power and influence is both desirable and normal. Small wonder, then, that it is difficult for us to discern the significance of the seemingly minor rift in the Marxist camp. After the event, both Liu Binyan and Wang Ruoshui acknowledged that their assertions of independent-mindedness occurred only as recently as 1984.¹⁹ Before then, it was inconceivable for either to have embarked on an interpretive course divergent from and threatening to the Party line, despite a certain obvious new latitude in ideological discussion. The thought of an alternative intelligence, a fundamentally different way of reading the Marxist message, was unimaginable. One could of course challenge the applicability of Marxist historiography to the Chinese situation as Li Shu ingeniously did in a series of articles in the *Lishiyanjiu* (Historical Study). One could also raise serious doubts about the reasonableness of certain basic Marxist precepts, such as the class struggle, which quite a number of scholars did in learned journals. One could even cite Marx to support one's non-Marxist viewpoints, claiming, paradoxically, that a true fellow of Karl Marx need not be a Marxist. Nevertheless, it was an entirely different matter to challenge the authority of the Party as the real arbiter of ideological disputes.

In fact, the infallibility of the Party was totally exploded during the ten disastrous years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Still, Party discipline was religiously observed by those scholar-officials holding responsible positions in government, the mass media, and institutes of higher learning. The Party began to recruit a number of the most brilliant minds from the intellectual community (including those denounced as rightists in the 1950s), reversing the long-term

policy of the 1970s, with its discrimination against intellectuals in favor of peasants, workers, and soldiers. By the mid-1980s, a new dynamism and optimism emerged among the intelligentsia, engendered principally by the open policy of the Party under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Intellectuals were vigorously mobilized and many participated enthusiastically in the effort to chart China's course toward modernization. This seemingly incredible turn of events must be seen against the backdrop of the role of the intellectual in socialist China. Despite the repeated campaigns against the so-called feudal mentality and bourgeois tendency of the intelligentsia, the political power of the Chinese intellectual through the exercise of its ideological influence has never waned.

Mao Zedong was acutely aware of this. While he is known for his realism—"Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun"²⁰—he deliberately cultivated his ideological power in the hope that his ideas would be embraced by the masses, despite the protest of the sophisticated intellectuals, and serve as a guiding principle for China's development. While he may have totally miscalculated the matter, his launching of the Cultural Revolution was intimately related to his desire to remain continuously relevant to, indeed vital to, China's modernization. Ironically, the most recent verdict on the validity of Mao Zedong's Thought was determined by the principle of *praxis*, enunciated by a group of reform-minded intellectuals. Chinese intellectuals, whether or not directly accessible to power at the center, remain politically consequential. Their self-definition demanded that they remain politically relevant. Mao, in this sense, was caught in the syndrome common to all Chinese intellectuals since the mid-nineteenth century.

For Chinese intellectuals, the decline and fall of China as a civilization-state in a matter of decades is akin to the experience of the Holocaust for the Jews, a constant reminder of their weakness, humiliation, guilt, and responsibility. The sense of urgency and the psychology of uncertainty, intertwined with an acute awareness that one's own fate is inextricably tied to the destiny of the nation, have caused political questions to predominate over all other interests in the perpetual Chinese intellectual search for self-definition. The overwhelming demand for relevance, participation, and activism which characterized the Chinese intellectual ethos for the first half of the twentieth century, was prompted by a strong sense of guilt.

Chinese intellectuals accepted their responsibility not only to raise the consciousness of the general public but also to function as the vanguards for “saving the nation” through direct participation in reform and revolution. As a consequence of this inevitable politicization of the culture, the intelligentsia marginalized themselves.

Having been thoroughly alienated from any indigenous resources, notably Confucianism, to help with national reconstruction, being utterly disillusioned by the imperialist designs of Japan in collusion with the Western powers, Chinese intellectuals tried desperately to find a way out of China’s semicolonial status. The combination of cultural iconoclasm and political patriotism considerably narrowed China’s options in its path toward modernization. Understandably, the introduction of Marxism-Leninism and the rise of the Chinese Communist Party were widely accepted by Chinese intellectuals as both necessary and desirable. Socialism was not imposed on China; it was the answer “totally iconoclastic and fiercely nationalistic” Chinese intellectuals found for China’s salvation. When Mao proudly announced that “China has stood up” at the Gate of Heavenly Peace on the founding of the People’s Republic of China (October 1, 1949), there was genuine jubilation.²¹

The Korean War, the rift with the Soviet Union, and the support for Vietnam further enhanced the intellectual conviction that the People’s Republic under the leadership of the Party was basically correct in developing a modernizing strategy of self-reliance congenial to China’s specific conditions. The mechanism of mass mobilization with an overbearing if not an omnipotent polity, a command economy, and group orientation, was the logical outcome of the felt need for a strong center. The “political system which is highly centralized, disciplined by a moralistic ideology, and heavily dependent upon authority”²² was assumed by intellectuals to be the most effective method for China’s modernization. The intractable realities of land and population and the hostile geopolitical environment created by the hegemonic control of the superpowers made it necessary for China to generate her own resources for development. The barracks mentality allowed the state to engage the whole country in a large-scale “socialist experiment” without a voice of discontent being raised. The antirightist campaign which stigmatized virtually all intellectuals outside the Party, like the ruthless policy of sending

intellectuals down to remote rural areas for reform through labor, met with little resistance. The unintended consequence was tragic:

The spirit of self-sacrifice, with its attendant willingness to subordinate all personal concerns to the well-being of the group, motivated by an idealism to involve one's body and soul actively in the revolution to save China, served to weaken the intelligentsia in a way unprecedented in Chinese history.²³

The community that resulted from this totalism, with its command economy and its group values, was a socialist state without basic liberties or rights, where private property and even the concept of privacy were outlawed. The astonishing fact is not that the intellectuals were silenced, but that they were willing to accept being taciturn as a minimum condition for participating in the socialist experiment.

The phenomenon of the *refusenik*, an integral part of the political and social landscape in the Soviet Union, was conspicuously absent in socialist China. The idea that as a member of the intelligentsia, inspired by the spirit of the Enlightenment, one would automatically alienate oneself from the state by subscribing to an alternative sense of truth and reality in opposition to the official ideology was preposterous; it was thought to be a demonstration of one's penchant for egoistic bourgeois mentality wholly incongruous with China's concrete situation. Nor was the argument of the Slavophiles persuasive. If the personality of Solzhenitsyn appears somewhat anachronistic even to contemporary American eyes, it was wholly inconceivable in the Chinese intellectual context. Even the arch-cultural conservative Liang Souming (1893–1988) fully supported the socialist approach to China's modernization. Any romantic assertion about the relevance of the richly textured pattern of China's past to her modern transformation would have been rejected outright as "excessive tenderheartedness" toward one's heritage. The paucity of either traditional or nonsocialist Western symbolic resources enabled the Party to have a monopolistic claim in the ideological domain.

The evolution of the *danwei* (unit) system, which eventually subsumed all personal, familial, local, and state structures under a comprehensive system of physical and symbolic control, was a rational outcome of this socialist rhetoric. The logic is simple but persuasive: to allow the Party leadership to utilize fully all the

nation's human and material resources for the common good. The Party is an instrument of total mobilization, minimizing all wastefulness caused by deviation. There was no danger of corruption of power if the Party embodied the general will of the whole populace. The major threat to this overall plan would be the inability, or worse, the unwillingness, of the intelligentsia to see both its soundness and its practicability. Since the overwhelming majority of intellectuals fully supported the grand design, even though they themselves were under tremendous suspicion, they accepted, at least passively, and many undoubtedly actively, the three inseparable dimensions of socialist China: an all-pervading authoritarianism, centralized economic planning, and highly coordinated group orientation. Either by choice or by default, the Chinese intellectuals tried hard to collaborate with the Party to bring about a new socialist order.

This implicit "covenant" made every intellectual vulnerable. Each aspect of his or her "being in the world"—birth, residence, growing up, schooling, work, travel, marriage, childbearing, childrearing, aging, death—was confined and defined in a tightly structured network. Constantly coached to act according to a prescribed pattern, they even developed internal referential surveillance to guard themselves against feudalist backsliding and the allure of bourgeois commercialism. When some were singled out for disciplinary action, they were promptly isolated by their fellow intellectuals. At the same time, they themselves immediately imposed a moratorium on their *guanxi* (human relations), fearing that their "social disease" was potentially contagious. Even conjugal or parental relationships could not create a safe haven for the "bad elements" (the rightists in the 1950s or the counter-revolutionary academic authorities in the 1960s). Numerous divorce agreements were signed simply to protect spouses and children from being contaminated by politically incorrect persons. The anticipated "confrontation between the brightest but marginalized intelligentsia and the least educated but most powerful cadres" did not take place. The intellectuals paid dearly for their willing incorporation into the grand Party design.

A distinctive feature of this overall plan is the rare combination of constraint and uncertainty. The omnipresence of the *danwei* system, informed by the ubiquity of the "personal file" (*dangan*), containing sensitive data on one's family history, education, political background, and ideological attitude, superimposed a watertight com-

partment on the intellectual. There was little horizontal or vertical mobility. One was literally at the mercy of one's unit. Yet, this meticulously constructed mechanism of control did not necessarily give one a sense of security. Far from being a protective cocoon, it was an integral part of the mass mobilization scheme. Intent on dramatic social transformation, the system was designed for dynamic process rather than for static structure. The life world of the Chinese intellectuals, individually and communally, was characterized by the sound and fury of political campaigns signifying the destructive restructuring of their human relations, jobs, mental universes, and every aspect of their physical existence.

They could take little comfort in knowing that occasionally the top leadership as well as the "good elements" (the 95 percent majority) also experienced the same fate. That President Liu Shaoqi died a lonely death after much humiliation and physical abuse in 1969, that starvation was the aftermath of the ill-conceived Long March, which claimed more than 20 million lives according to conservative official estimates, did not lead intellectuals to refuse to identify themselves with the socialist course. After all, Liu Binyan's "second kind of loyalty"²⁴ meant that true loyalty took into consideration the long-term well-being of the Party. Though Wang Ruoshui remarked jokingly that in the Chinese Marxist camp, where one person had been deified as God and the rest reduced to ghosts, he remained a staunch supporter of socialism.²⁵

The residual of this unquestioned commitment to the common goal remained strong throughout the early 1980s. The Party, as the embodiment of a historical mission to make China modern, was surely not infallible, as the official and nonofficial commentators on the Cultural Revolution vigorously argued in the printed media, but since it had been instrumental in defining collectively what the course of action ought to be at any given juncture, the Party was the most reliable *modus operandi* in adjudicating ideological disputes through consensus. The erratic and often chaotic mass-line politics during the Cultural Revolution were proof that the smooth functioning of the Party at the ideological center was vitally important for social stability, a precondition for economic development. The Party, so conceived, was not only a political instrument but also a moral force. To be sure, the Party might have committed major mistakes in the past by allowing itself to be mismanaged, misguided, misappropri-

ated, and manipulated to serve the private interests of a small coterie of power holders, but to the extent that the specific conditions contributing to China's backwardness had not been fundamentally changed, the Party had a critical role to play, which justified both its existence and its irreducibility. To challenge the authority of the Party was not only to deny its legitimacy and to question the cumulative wisdom it symbolized, but also to raise serious doubts about the rationale underlying China's socialist approach to modernity. For those who held responsible positions in government, the mass media, and institutes of higher learning, any doubt of the Party was a grave matter, a threat to their livelihood, a heavy burden on their conscience. The lack of a communal critical self-consciousness among the intellectuals was evidenced in Ba Jin's abortive attempt to build a Cultural Revolution museum to serve as a perpetual reminder of the brutal persecution of thinkers, writers, scholars, and teachers. The intelligentsia, cooperating with the Party, preferred collective amnesia as a less painful approach to the national disgrace.

The situation changed drastically in the late 1980s. Deng Xiaoping's strategy that economic reform could proceed without political restructuring was no longer practicable. The ideological ethos of the Party leadership, with its emphasis on the superiority of the socialist model, appeared outmoded, irrelevant, and to many university students, ridiculous. On the economic front, urban reform was fraught with self-contradictory features and unpredictable dangers. Despite the rhetoric of decentralization, the Chinese government was never prepared to relinquish its monopolistic control of heavy industries—machine-tool production, shipbuilding and public transportation, banking, insurance, broadcasting, foreign trade, and even tourism.²⁶ Those enterprises constituted the bulk of the nation's productivity. Liberalization simply permitted management to exercise some discretion in decision making. Private entrepreneurship was limited to small shops, food services, retail trade, and certain new businesses deemed either unprofitable or unmanageable under public ownership. The vibrancy of the newly emerging private economy was itself a mixed blessing. As taxi drivers or retail sellers began to earn more than professors and higher civil servant cadres, a sense of relative deprivation was acutely felt by the intellectuals: "those who play the piano are inferior to those who move the piano" and "the

one who cuts open the skull [brain surgeon] is worse off than the one who shaves the head [barber].”²⁷

The problem was compounded by a fierce struggle in the highest echelon of the Party between the promoters of economic rationalization, who opted for technical solutions to complex issues of labor, inflation, price, and ownership, and the partisan doctrinaires, who still adhered to Soviet-style economic planning. The over-enthusiasm of the reformers, determined to stretch to the limit their tentative programs in an adventurist brinkmanship, and the inflexibility of the hard-liners, still clinging to Marxism as a security blanket as well as an instrumental justification for their activities, incapacitated the Party to make any headway in developing a coherent policy. The Party itself, in the perception of the intellectuals, lost much of its credibility as the locus of leadership; intraparty politics blatantly exhibited “surprise, intrigue, and the work of unidentified forces.”²⁸ The boldness of Gorbachev’s *glasnost* and *perestroika* that released much intellectual power, thawing the frozen discourse of communism, made the paralysis of the Chinese gerontocracy intolerably confining and oppressive. Frightened by the explosive energy unlocked by the Solidarity movement in Poland, Deng strongly advised his colleagues that harsh measures would be meted out to deal with any students’ or workers’ demonstrations. Meanwhile, intellectuals reached broad consensus that they could no longer support the government unless efforts were substantial and sustained in five critical areas: (1) anticorruption, (2) punishment of official profiteering, (3) revitalization of education, (4) promotion of democratic polity, and (5) persistent and continuing reform.²⁹

As the Party’s public accountability continued to erode, the Chinese communist leadership took on more and more the features of a private clique obsessed with its own vested interest. Instead of practicing socialism, they seemed to be guided by the rules of the game of secret societies (“black societies”). When Zhao Ziyang was alleged to have leaked the most jealously guarded Party secret to Gorbachev on May 16, 1989, that, despite Deng’s titles, he was the final decision maker on all vital issues, it merely confirmed the strong impression that the Long Marchers and the veterans of the Yan’an period had transformed themselves into beneficiaries of a nepotistic network, resembling the inner court in imperial China. The nickname for Deng was “the Empress Dowager”; many of his associates

resembled the eunuchs and in-laws of the emperor's family, with neither legitimacy nor credibility. The faith in the Four Cardinal Principles was lost, and, with it, the trust in the accountability of the Party and the efficiency of the government. Deng Xiaoping's opening remarks to martial law officers on June 9 were fatalistic:

This disturbance was bound to come sooner or later. It was determined by the international macro climate and China's micro climate. It was definitely coming and was something that could not be diverted by man's will; it was only a matter of time and scale.³⁰

The new and total alienation of the intelligentsia from the Party created new possibilities for a style of politics unprecedented in socialist China, but uncannily bona fide in historical terms.

THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Non-Marxist currents of thought have dominated the intellectual landscape of socialist China since 1985. They were not floating symbolic resources, but organized social forces, claiming an institutionalized base, having far-reaching political implications. Although universities and colleges provided safe havens for such currents to flow and flourish in urban centers throughout China—notably Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Wuhan—offered a hospitable and encouraging environment for their development. A variety of innovative networks, from formally organized and government-sponsored international conferences to ad hoc gatherings of like-minded people, fundamentally restructured the pattern of intellectual communication. The constraint of vertical integration imposed by the *danwei* system broke down. Enterprising intellectuals were able to take all sorts of initiative to start their own magazines, establish their own academies, organize their own research teams, found their own publishing companies, form their own salons. A curiously non-socialist phenomenon occurred in which the *danwei* system was supplanted by a new style of voluntary association. Especially noteworthy was the emergence of the patron-client relationship as a salient pattern of human interaction in think tanks, adult education, correspondence schools, training centers, and consultation groups, reminiscent of joint ventures in the capitalist economy. The largest computer company, Beijing Stone Group, for example, developed its

own research institute; it later became a key player in the Democracy Movement in the spring of 1989.

Actually, shortly after the reinstitution of college entrance examinations in 1977, university students had begun to develop local and national networks. Taking advantage of the experience of “establishing revolutionary ties” (*geming chuanlian*) during the Cultural Revolution when the Red Guards were given special permission to travel free all over the country by public transportation (mainly by train and bus), they set up numerous channels of communication to develop their own distinctive style of “life politics.”³¹ The class of 1977, for example, managed to create a loosely structured but amazingly effective alliance, involving seventeen key universities throughout the country, to make their voices heard. Only weeks after the fall-term classes were in session, they published the first issue of *This Generation*, showing a high level of intellectual sophistication on issues relating to democracy and freedom. Although plans for subsequent issues were made, with representatives of the participating universities working out their implementation, the Party authorities at the Beijing Normal University promptly put a stop to the joint venture. Still, similar efforts were made at Peking University, People’s University, Nankai University in Tianjing, and Wuhan University, among a host of other institutes of higher learning.

There were deep historical roots for such university student involvement. In socialist China, they had considered themselves politically engaged, relevant, and potent. In an elegiac couplet lamenting the death of Hu Yaobang, the following line appears:

The sound of wind, the sound of rain, the sound of books being read;
Each sound calls out for the heroic soul.³²

This adaptation of Gao Panlong’s (1562–1626) couplet for the Donglin Academy in the Ming dynasty shows a powerful sense of intellectual self-definition. The original reads:

The sound of wind, the sound of rain, the sound of books being read,
each sound enters our ears;
The affairs of the family, the affairs of the country, and the affairs all
under Heaven, each affair touches our hearts.³³

Since sounds of wind and rain symbolize disturbances in nature, the message is clear. It is the personal responsibility of those who are privileged to be educated to speak out in time of national crisis.

This centuries-long tradition of intellectual protest took on a new form in socialist China. The authoritarian state, with its modern technology of surveillance and its comprehensive intelligence network, allowed little space for dissident activity. Furthermore, since the Party assumed the role of the sole spokesman for the general will of the people, its security apparatus was particularly sensitive to ideological deviation. It is, therefore, awe-inspiring to learn that, despite the apparent lack of a “loyal opposition,” voices challenging the legitimacy of the Party, the authority of the state, and the validity of the official ideology were frequently heard. What the class of 1977 expressed as the authentic voice of their generation was none other than the continuation of a persistent subterranean tradition.

An early example of this was the work of the literary theorist Wang Shiwei, who sparked an intense debate among young revolutionaries in Yan'an when he probed the dark side of the communist leadership with his impassioned essay “The Wild Lily” in the 1940s.³⁴ The plurality of considered opinions, expressed by Western-trained intellectuals who challenged every aspect of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong's Thought in 1957, was another obvious example.³⁵ The famous “Liyizhe” big-character poster (*dazibao*), “A Call for Democracy and Rule by Law,” in 1974 was symptomatic of how deeply the spirit of protest had been ingrained in the otherwise enslaved intellectual mind.³⁶ With 20,000 Chinese characters, “Liyizhe” (a pseudonym for three ideologically sophisticated young workers in Guangdong) raised serious doubts about the socialist system in China.

The Tiananmen incident of April 5, 1976, in which hundreds of thousands of mourners for Premier Zhou Enlai defied the strict orders of martial law and expressed their moral indignation against the power holders in poems on big-character posters, signified the potential of this undercurrent. In fact, it was the brutal suppression of this spirit of protest that led to the downfall of the Gang of Four, the reemergence of Deng Xiaoping. Despite Deng's ruthless tactics, outlawing the big-character posters, the Xidan Democracy Wall lived on as a shared memory, a source of inspiration. It is not surprising that in a series of letters that opened the floodgates of protest in 1988–1989 Ren Wangding, Fang Lizhi, and Bei Dao all joined in asking that the hero of the Democracy Wall, Wei Jingsheng, be pardoned.

The practice of “public discussion” (*gonglun*) in traditional China, aptly explained by William. T. de Bary, is relevant.³⁷ The communal critical self-consciousness of Confucian intellectuals, underlying their whole discourse, is predicated on a multifaceted mode of moral reasoning. As those fortunate enough to have read the books of the sages and the worthies, they are no longer “private citizens” but witnesses of the Mandate of Heaven. As transmitters of culture informed by a profound sense of history, they are responsible for providing continuous critical reflection on current politics. As guardians of public morality who work with their hearts and minds to establish a constant purpose in life without access to permanent property, they are particularly concerned about the well-being of the people. And, as educators dedicated to the creative transformation of society, they must cultivate their own reflectiveness. Intellectuals as witnesses, transmitters, guardians, and educators are required to engage themselves in open discussion for the sake of the public good as well as their own solidarity.³⁸

The distinction of “public” (*gong*) and “private” (*si*) is crucial but subtle. It is misleading to take a static structuralist approach by assigning a specific area to each of these categories, for inherent in the dichotomy is a perceived attitude laden with broad moral implications. The idea of *gong* as referring to “the sum total of the harmonized self-interests of all members of a community,” “altruism (nonselfishness),” or “the imperial bureaucratic state”³⁹ is helpful except in its failure to account for the dynamic interchange between enlightened self-interest and public accountability characteristic of the Chinese discourse on *gong*. Located on the continuum between the self and “all under Heaven” mediated by the family and the state, the realm of *gong*, often understood as public-spiritedness, emerges at all levels. Cultivation of one’s personal life, regulation of the family, governance of the state, and peace under Heaven are, in their proper contexts, realizations of *gong*, whereas self-centeredness, nepotism, chauvinistic nationalism, or anthropocentrism can be perceived as an expression of *si*.

The *locus classicus* for Sun Yat-sen’s favorite phrase, *tianxia weigong* (impartiality all under Heaven), is the idea of “the Great Unity” in the *Book of Rites*.⁴⁰ From this exalted perspective, the doctrine of national interest, without appealing to a more generalized principle of mutuality, is a manifestation of the “private” domain; it

fails to live up to the expectation of public-spiritedness. On the other hand, learning for the sake of the self, to the extent that it helps overcome selfish desires, is an embodiment of *gong*. When Deng Xiaoping reemerged as a public-spirited leader in 1978, he was sometimes affectionately nicknamed by students as well as peasants "the Blue Sky," symbolizing his uprightness and impartiality. However, after the Tiananmen tragedy, despite the self-righteous tone of his pronouncements, in the eyes of the Beijing citizens, he was simply desperately trying to justify his selfish design on behalf of the Central Committee. As Deng seeks to consolidate his gerontocracy, it more and more resembles the private domain of a secret society. The Party, with all its propaganda machine, is no longer in control of the public sphere.

It is by now well established that the Democracy Movement, at its inception, made a conscientious attempt to avoid challenging the authority of the Party by offering a radically different vision of social and political reality. Wisely advised by Ph.D. candidates and faculty members, the university students made a deliberate effort to avoid using Western democratic concepts, such as liberties and rights. Instead, they opted, principally out of necessity, to accept the rules of the game imposed by the regime and to evoke values espoused by the Party and readily understandable to people in the street. Indeed, student leaders initially went out of their way to demonstrate their solidarity with the Party. A cynic may suggest that the tactic was intended to undermine the authority of the Party leadership, exposing its incompetence, ruthlessness, or both. Yet, it does not require a charitable reading of the documents to note that their primary objective was not confrontation but dialogue.

The judgment that Zhao Ziyang and perhaps Deng Xiaoping were on their side was based on a measure of realism, not on fantasy. The apparently sincere and symbolically effective ritualistic gesture of presenting their request by kneeling on the steps of the People's Great Hall and begging Premier Li Peng to receive them in an audience was unexpected. Still, by fully acknowledging the asymmetrical relationship between absolute authority and powerlessness, they deeply impressed the ordinary Beijing citizen and gained the overwhelming sympathy of workers. The avoidance of any reference to the possibility of a subversive act against the political establishment was a deliberately calculated move, dictated by a realistic assessment of the

total situation, designed to establish the broadest base of popular support. The demands were modest, reasonable, and practicable; the methods, nonconfrontational, nonviolent, and peaceful. Yet Deng's reaction was uncompromising, harsh. He first characterized the movement as "turmoil" in the infamous April twenty-sixth editorial of the *People's Daily*.⁴¹ As this inflamed student and citizen anger, the tone of the protest became increasingly indignant. Still, the New May Fourth Manifesto, drafted by student leaders, remained judiciously measured:

Our views are not in conflict with those of the government. We only have one goal: the modernization of China.

... Our present tasks are: first, to take the lead in carrying out experiment in democratic reform at the birthplace of the student movement—the university campus, democratizing the systematizing campus life; second, to participate actively in politics, to persist in our request for a dialogue with the government, to push democratic reforms of our political system, to oppose graft and corruption, and to work for a press law. We recognize that these short-term objectives are only the first steps in democratic reform; they are tiny, unsteady steps. But we must struggle for these first steps, we must cheer for these first steps.⁴²

It is scarcely surprising that many analysts, with the hindsight of the massacre in mind, speculated that "had Deng Xiaoping and the government adopted a more conciliatory and flexible approach at the beginning, agreeing for example to meet with the representatives of the autonomous student union, the Students' Federation, and refraining from branding the demonstrations 'turmoil,' citizen sympathy for the students would have faded and a large-scale movement been avoided."⁴³ The students' emotional appeal to the Chinese citizens by staging a hunger strike on the thirteenth of May was perhaps the single most important reason for their success in claiming moral authority in the public sphere:

Our purest feelings of patriotism, our simple and complete innocence, have been called "turmoil," have been described as "ulterior motives," and have been alleged to be "exploited by a small handful of people." We wish to ask all true Chinese citizens, to ask each worker, peasant, soldier, city resident, intellectual, noted figure, government official, policeman, and those people who have concocted these accusations

against us to place your hands on your hearts, and ask your consciences what crimes we have committed. Are we creating turmoil?⁴⁴

By identifying themselves with “this country,” “its people,” and “the government,” the students ingeniously and effectively pushed Li Peng, Deng Xiaoping, and their gerontocracy into a corner. The arrival of Minister of Finance Guo Wanjong from Taipei in early May and the highly publicized Gorbachev visit in mid-May deepened the sense of humiliation, helplessness, and urgency among those in power. Subsequently, the students, with the full support of the Beijing citizens, managed to frustrate several plans of bringing soldiers into the capital, into the square itself. A false sense of security became pervasive.

The fateful May 17 declaration, signed by many luminaries of Chinese cultural and intellectual life, including the political scientist Yan Jiaqi, the philosopher Li Zehuo, and the journalist Dai Qing, pointed the accusatory finger directly at Deng Xiaoping and called him “an aged, fatuous dictator.”⁴⁵ This defiant tone grew, despite the declaration of martial law on May 20. By then, the intelligentsia strongly believed that Li Peng’s dismissal was inevitable, even imminent. Deng had no choice but to compromise. The euphoria was such that thoughts of a postsocialist China with a constitutional multi-party democracy became common. The sudden appearance of the “Goddess of Democracy,” staring at the giant portrait of Mao Zedong on the evening of May 29, was perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of this newly emerged and provocative confrontation, just prior to the June 4 tragedy. It is worth noting that even then, the choice of democracy over liberty was intended to stay clear of any possible linkage with Bourgeois Liberalization.

The short-lived Democracy Movement (April 17–June 4), shows conclusively not only the presence of animated debates in the public sphere but also the beginnings of a civil society in socialist China. For approximately fifty days, the city of Beijing exhibited a civic spirit, a sense of civility, thought to have been destroyed by the Cultural Revolution. There was a pervasive feeling of interconnectedness, mutual bonding, and collective responsibility in public places—markets, crowded buses, mess halls. In the midst of what the government condemned as a major turmoil, traffic incidents decreased substantially, the normal functions of the metropolis contin-

ued smoothly, the streets were safe, and the legendary “Flying Tigers” formed a mobile communication unit to coordinate security matters throughout the city.⁴⁶ There was a heightened sensitivity toward the needs of others, reminiscent of the polite old Peking citizenry. Altruism and self-sacrifice were readily visible as the numbers of residents determined to help the students swelled. According to several accounts, even secret societies of thieves and others of that sort publicly announced their support for the student cause by voluntarily suspending their clandestine activities.⁴⁷ This brief utopia, widely reported in the Chinese print and electronic media, especially by journalists from Hong Kong, helped spur a demonstration by more than a million residents in the British colony in support of the Democracy Movement against the imposition of martial law on May 21.

The euphoria of the Chinese intelligentsia may have been premature, but the belief that China will eventually make an exit from communism or at least transcend the Four Cardinal Principles is not wholly unfounded, even if qualifications need to be made. Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong’s Thought—all constitutive parts of the official ideology—have lost their persuasive power. Mao’s stature, both physical and symbolic, has fallen. Lenin is no longer relevant; Marx is being humanized. The Chinese Communist Party has been inoperative in vital areas of economic reform. It may be dismantled or fundamentally restructured through election or negotiation without the social fabric being destroyed, with the inevitable massive instability that would follow. “The democratic dictatorship of the people” is an oxymoron. Derived from the classical Marxist-Leninist idea of “the dictatorship of the proletariat,” it is basically a justification for a one-party autocracy predicated on the economic system of public ownership. Market-oriented reform has already undermined its validity. Socialism, in Richard Baum’s pithy phrase, as cognitive formalism, narrow empiricism, dogmatic scientism, feudal bureaucratism, and compulsive ritualism⁴⁸ is dead.

In short, the Four Cardinal Principles cannot be upheld. Fang Lizhi was not unduly optimistic when he prophesied that while democratization remained an unfinished revolution, “China’s time will come.”⁴⁹ Yet, in the absence of a Holy Grail of democratic opposition, notably “the extraordinary alliance of workers and intelligentsia that was once embodied in Poland’s Solidarity movement,”⁵⁰ China’s

goal of modernization is elusive and her path toward democracy is certain to be tortuous. The difficulty of taking advantage of the dynamism in the public sphere and transforming it into a full-fledged civil society seems to be the major problem.

Marie-Claire Bergère, in her analysis *The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911–1927*, singled out a critical element in “the sorry history of the Chinese Bourgeoisie in the 1920s,” namely the perception “that the State is indispensable to the constitution of a society and that liberalism itself must be a product of the State.”⁵¹ The events at the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen) may enhance her conviction that a fatal flaw in the Democracy Movement is “the habit of the heart” endemic to the Chinese intellectual community since the turn of the century:

It is hardly surprising that the Chinese Bourgeoisie and part of the May Fourth intelligentsia arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary to restore governmental authority and that, despite the fact that it meant giving up the autonomy they had acquired thanks to economic expansion and the decline of the bureaucratic apparatus over preceding years, they even worked toward that end.⁵²

This prompted He Baogang and David Kelly to conclude that “while defining democracy, legality, [and] human rights as cultural universals, Chinese intellectuals know that access to them can be gained only in the context of a politically loaded act of cultural critique. They cannot appeal to the symbolic order of European civilization as their lost home.”⁵³

The conviction that given virtuous, culturally enlightened political leadership, civil society is superfluous may have been deeply ingrained in the Chinese intellectual consciousness, but the dilemma is that without “a full-blooded legitimation of civil society”⁵⁴ the intelligentsia has neither the independence from the state nor the access to power at the center to achieve its purposes. If Chinese intellectuals are to be “self-consciously coordinated toward common political objectives,”⁵⁵ they must transform their communal critical self-consciousness into the self-reflectivity of a strategy to develop civil society not only for its own sake, but also for its instrumental power to bring about a new political order.

This option does not necessarily require the *embourgeoisement* of individuals mobilized against the state. The process of relegitimizing

the civilization-state (not the Party) with a strong civil society and a symbolically respectable and culturally influential center may turn out to be the most efficacious course of action. China's strong tradition of self-reliance at personal, familial, communal, and national levels, together with a richly textured social networking, provides valuable resources for this effort. The perceived "tragedy of the Chinese revolution" that "even with all the shocks the country has gone through, its culture is still one of extreme dependence upon authority"⁵⁶ is conceptually limited and empirically unwarranted. To paraphrase Pierre Nora, a Chinese intellectual "will always have trouble understanding why for twenty years so many young people in France preferred being wrong with Sartre rather than right with Raymond Aron."⁵⁷ The historical fact that "France has had a secularized heritage of several hundred years of Christian transcendence and the Catholic Church"⁵⁸ is vitally important in such matters. Ernest Gellner's observation is particularly instructive. The French style of Enlightenment, "whether in the form of the doctrine of the Encyclopaedists, the Comtian positivism, or its prolonged later addiction to Marxism," is drawn to "systems built of mundane, naturalistic or historicist elements, but one, in its general architecture and spirit, mirroring all too faithfully that which it would repudiate and replace."⁵⁹

Predictably, in the Chinese case, even after the crisis in community becomes evident, the communal heritage survives not only in the economy and in social organizations, but in the intellectual ethos and in the minds of the people as well. The background of China as a civilization-state is relevant here, but the assertion that "Chinese culture, especially after the ideological impact of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, is less ready than ever to accept division of authority and precise accountability"⁶⁰ is mistaken. Notwithstanding the danger of New Authoritarianism or the anathema of cultural elitism, the revitalization of civil society with Chinese characteristics is already well under way. The transformation of Leninism to "authoritarian-pluralism" may be painfully difficult but probable; as a first step, it is inevitable.⁶¹ Pluralism in economic structure, political

organization, social practice, and cultural life is an emerging phenomenon, a feature of socialist China.

PLURALITY OF EXPERIENCE IN A CIVILIZATION-STATE

Put in the double contexts of cultural China and industrial East Asia, a new perspective presents itself. The kinds of intellectual effervescence in socialist China, while astonishingly new on the Mainland, have been fully appreciated and often channeled through appropriate institutions in art, literature, thought, and religion contributing to cultural vibrancy in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. The sight and sound of young artists experimenting with avant-garde forms and young musicians improvising with electronic systems have not "spiritually polluted" cultural China or industrial East Asia on the periphery. On the contrary, as these societies become "more porous, thus susceptible to a variety of external influences,"⁶² including those of Bourgeois Liberalization from the West, they are more conscious of the need to tap their own indigenous resources for cultural reconstruction.

Furthermore, diversity in economic culture, together with inclusiveness in the political process, make Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons figure among the more dynamic and transforming regions in the world. The fact that, in comparison with Western Europe and North America, a non-Western and non-Protestant area has developed a less adversarial, less litigious, and less individualistic but equally, if not more, competitive market economy indicates that modernization based on shared Confucian heritage can assume a distinctive East Asian or, by implication, Chinese cultural form. It is worth noting that, with ethnic homogeneity, family stability, national commitment to education, and respect for authority, industrial East Asia and, to a certain extent, communist East Asia as well are not today confronted with racial tension, drugs, crime, lack of child care, and deterioration of quality in education, as we are, even though they may suffer from other equally serious problems of their own.

Among the non-Marxist ideas that have emerged in the 1980s, three feature most prominently: scientific rationalism, democratic liberalism, and Confucian humanism. The fruitful interaction among them is reflected in journals such as *Reading, Toward the Future*, *Culture: China and the World*, and *New Enlightenment* and also in

the networking of institutions such as the Academy of Chinese Culture, the Youth Forum, and the Twenty-First Century Research Institute. Of course, “in the face of the pragmatic impulses stemming from economic primacy,” ideology “as a set of cosmic ideas and values that provide a comprehensive guide to thought and action” seems less compelling.⁶³ Nevertheless, the new ideological vitality, symbolizing a level of self-reflection, critical thinking, and cultural sophistication rarely encountered since the May Fourth Movement in 1919, was certainly instrumental in launching the Democracy Movement.

Intellectual freedom reached new heights in late 1988 and early 1989 because of heightened communal critical self-consciousness among the intellectuals. The convergence of opinion that extraordinary events would occur in 1989, on the occasion of the bicentenary of the French Revolution, the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, and the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic, proved correct. By then, “many intellectuals [had] spun out of the Party’s control and even out of the orbit of Party influence.” The trend was irreversible: “As the bounds of intellectual freedom had expanded, so had the conviction that there should be no bounds.”⁶⁴ However, the focus among several conflicting modes of inquiry amidst a wide variety of ideological recommendations continued to be: “Whither China?”

The political implications for any answer to this question, from the perspective of scientific rationalism, democratic liberalism, or Confucian humanism, are far-reaching. An intriguing counterfactual speculation is: had the “dialogue” between the intelligentsia and the Party been successful, could democracy with distinctive Chinese characteristics have been developed within the system? As expected, the post-Tiananmen consensus is no. Relegitimization of the Party, with New Authoritarianism, was never a live option, the current attempts appear doomed. Yet, the question merits further consideration. Since “neither the world at large nor Asia in particular [is] destined to have a total convergence of political systems,”⁶⁵ China’s “tradition, scale, geographic position and stage of development” must be taken into consideration.⁶⁶ Land scarcity, overpopulation, and the fundamental conflict between industrialization and ecology are intractable realities. The cry for China’s Gobachev has subsided, though his reputation as a liberal-democratic hero is established in the minds of exiled intellectuals. Ironically, Li Peng, the much hated

“black hand” behind the Tiananmen tragedy, seems to have avoided the anticipated fiscal disaster; he has put his economic reform project on a seemingly firm foundation.

Still, the apprehension for China’s future remains unusually strong. *The Yellow Peril (Huanghuo)*, a recent science fiction by an unidentified author with close ties to the Democracy Movement, offers a Chinese version of Armageddon caused by a nuclear confrontation between two post-Deng political factions, forcing millions of Chinese to emigrate.⁶⁷ Reactions to the doomsday message, reflected in scores of articles in cultural China outside the Mainland, conveys a strong and widely shared feeling that China after socialism will be fraught with contradictions and struggle. The anxiety that a frustrated and humiliated China, like the angry goddess of volcanos in Hawaiian mythology, will unleash powerful destructive force to end all the pain and suffering of an oppressive world reveals itself frequently in current Chinese art and literature:

I want to use my sulphur, my lava, my showers of stones
To destroy your colosseum, your temples, your cities;
To destroy your sun god, your moon god, your Supreme Being;
To destroy everything, everything that you have forced upon me.⁶⁸

On the other hand, a more sober view holds that China will gradually develop a de facto democracy informed by “authoritarian-pluralism,” a sort of Singaporean model. It is worth noting that local elections have already been put into effect at the commune-village level, which means that an estimated 500 million Chinese have been exposed to some measure of democracy in practice.⁶⁹ Given the centrality of local elections in Taiwan’s democratic experience, the political significance of this phenomenon should not be underestimated. The actual practice of regional autonomy in matters like taxation, security, investment policy, foreign trade, and life-style is being experienced by prosperous provinces like Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Hunan, a practice again congenial to democratization. Signs of economic diversification, that will lead necessarily to political pluralism, clearly advantageous to developing a democratic ethos, are readily visible.

“Natural economic territories” (NETS) are being formed along the coast, significantly changing the economic and social landscape of socialist China. Visible NETS, either firmly established or emerging,

now include Hong Kong/Guangdong, Taiwan/Fujian, and Shandong/South Korea. The emerging interdependency of these economic zones makes the pattern of interaction and interpenetration more complex daily, challenging not only political authority but the idea of sovereignty as well.⁷⁰ In the regional context, discussions of the construction of a “greater Chinese economic circle” (*da Zhonghua jingji quan*) involving scholars from Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, though still in an inchoate stage, are likely to bring about joint ventures at both government and private levels.⁷¹ Overseas Chinese investment, through local ties and family connections, has penetrated every area in urban China. The transformation of the rural economy to semi-industrialization of the countryside is widespread. Manufacturing, construction, transportation, and commercial food services have become independent productive sectors in rural economy. Farmers today constitute 53 percent of the total population; many predict that the figure will be further reduced to 32 percent by the end of the century.⁷² Non-government-controlled productivity, including private and market-oriented semiofficial enterprises, claims more than 50 percent of the national economy; its contribution to the 9 percent national growth rate in 1990 was substantial.⁷³ These factors suggest that the argument that China’s route to modernization will be continually monitored by “a political system which is highly centralized, disciplined by a moralistic ideology, and heavily dependent upon authority”⁷⁴ is at least questionable.

Authoritarian-pluralism seems to suggest that the coexistence of centralized control and an open-door policy is perhaps practicable. Yet, “political tightening and economic diversification are basically incompatible.”⁷⁵ Openness will lead to decentralization. Is the disintegration of China as a unified nation inevitable? Speculations on reorganizing socialist China as a federation of independent states or as a united states, as a commonwealth or simply as the Middle Country abound. Fears of a regression to the warlord period of disunity, with military confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as a result of the Taiwan independence movement are common. Predictions of the collapse of the Hong Kong economy by 1997, or the drifting apart of the prosperous southeastern provinces from the impoverished north are persistent.

An issue of great significance is ethnicity, though racial tension is not today a serious source of unrest in Chinese society. China’s

minority populations, 6 to 8 percent, depending on the different criteria used in official estimates and communal self-definition, may actually involve as many as 80 million people sparsely settled in border regions occupying more than half of Chinese territory. The increasing awareness of Chinese intelligentsia, especially the recently exiled scholars and students, that Chinese culture has never been and, for decades to come, will not be able to assimilate Tibetans, Mongols, Kazhaks, and Uighurs generates a new realism. This cultural reflexivity enables them to transcend nationalism, not to mention Han Chinese chauvinism, to openly acknowledge the gravity of the ethnic factor in Chinese domestic and international politics. Some have already publicly supported the establishment of an independent Tibet. The shape of China as a political entity is likely to be redefined before the twenty-first century.

From a historical and a cultural viewpoint, symbolic communication and a shared value orientation featured more prominently than bureaucratic control and military conquest in the traditional Chinese civilization-state. The success of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) to forge a solid alliance of Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, and Tibetans in establishing a unified empire may give the impression that administrative effectiveness and military might were the main reasons for the survival of the Middle Kingdom. In fact, in the governance of the provinces and the management of international affairs, the Manchu court relied more heavily on ideological persuasion and moral sanction than on brute force. An unintended consequence of the Manchu conquest of China was the total sinicization of the Manchus, so that they now comprise some of the most erudite of scholars of Confucian classics.

Educational edicts, morality books, public lectures, sermons, village compacts, community schools, mutual responsibility associations, and self-help groups were all essential ingredients in the moral ecology of traditional Chinese society. Needless to say, the manner of living ordinary life in China, constrained by the circumstances of the initial conditions compounded by the institutional imperatives of modernization, makes Chinese society radically different from anything that exists in Western Europe, North America, or industrial East Asia. The renewed faith that the cultivation of the person and the regulation of the family are preconditions of organic social solidarity and governance of the state is in no way surprising. The

national craze of *qigong* (a system of deep breathing exercises for physical and mental health) confirms the staying power of certain patterns of thought: self-cultivation is the root for communal well-being. This mechanism of control, laden with dangers of ideological manipulation and moralist suppression, is apparently incompatible with liberties, rights, and the due process of law, but its traditional appeal to social solidarity and its added modern appeal to the principle of equality are assets rather than liabilities in China's quest for modernization.

The absence of church-state differentiation connotes the lack of an exclusive dichotomy between the secular and the sacred. The process of secularization, so crucial to the rise of the modern West, did not occur in China, because the civilization-state was as much an ethicoreligious presence as a sociopolitical reality. The importance of symbolic communication in the maintenance of such a system cannot be exaggerated. Edwin Reischauer, in his masterly essay "The Sinic World in Perspective," addresses this issue in the context of East Asian culture including Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. Whether labeled "the Confucian cultural universe" or "the Chinese-character (*Hanzi* or *kanji*) cultural circle," the relevance and centrality of the symbolic communication and a shared value orientation in the Sinic world is essential to an understanding of the economic dynamics and political transformation of both industrial and communist East Asia.

We have only begun to explore the implications of these immensely complex phenomena. If we take the Chinese character as an example of symbolic communication, we must imagine, in the European context, not only the survival of Latin but also the total absence of any other written Romance or Germanic languages. This analogy, while not totally applicable to Japanese, Korean, or Vietnamese, which have developed their own distinctive scripts, only emphasizes the differences with China, where linguistically the difference between Cantonese and Mandarin is greater than that between English and German, but where Cantonese and the Mandarin-speaking Northerners share the same written language. Their actual linguistic gap is considerably narrowed by appealing to a common cultural heritage.

By contrast, the linguistic communication of the European Community, for obvious cultural reasons, must be facilitated by a translation apparatus more elaborate than that of the United Na-

tions. Imagine the positive contribution of a shared written language to reintegration, if the Europeans were able only to write in Latin though they spoke local dialects, such as English, Spanish, French, and German. Linguistically, the European Community can never be fully integrated, despite the popularity of English. The Chinese civilization-state, by contrast, is not likely to fall apart, though in theory and practice several mutually unintelligible linguistic groups exist in China proper.

Still, the argument that Chinese civilization has given “inordinate strength and durability” to the political culture of the state is compelling. By the standards of the Chinese historical experience, the European Community has never experienced real political reintegration since the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. The united front formed out of economic contingency can hardly address deep-rooted nationalist and racial sentiments. The frustrating episode of the concerted effort of the European Community to deal with the ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia is a clear indication of this. The anticipated adoption of a uniform currency (imagine the disappearance of the British pound!) only scratches the surface of a solid base for real interdependency. The disintegration of the USSR, in this sense, is a return to normalcy. After all, it was a failed socialist experiment of the twentieth century. It is unlikely that an independent Ukraine or the sovereign state of Georgia will inspire separatist movements based on cultural and ethnic sentiments in Sichuan, Hunan, or Guangdong. The past USSR and the future European Community are artificially constructed out of political and economic visions and experiences, whereas China as a civilization-state has endured for millennia. Indeed, China proper has been reunified and reintegrated, often under foreign conquests, at least five times since the collapse of the Han dynasty in the third century.

Undoubtedly, “China is a society that will undergo many travails in its long march toward development,”⁷⁶ but, as a civilization-state, the shared value orientation that the divergent forces in cultural China learn to adopt through confrontation as well as negotiation will have enduring significance for the global community. Can a market economy be guided by an impartial state, which possesses great authority but limited power, through nuanced and publicly accountable negotiations? Is democratic polity compatible with meritocracy, defined not only by professional competence but also by

moral rectitude? Can dignity, independence, and autonomy of the person be incorporated into a concept of selfhood as a center of relationships and as a broadening process of self-realization? Is China's self-interest generalizable to include an ever-expanding network of interdependence: cultural China, Confucian East Asia, the Asia-Pacific Rim, and beyond? Does China as a civilization-state have enough symbolic resources to depoliticize the center and, at the same time, revitalize its cultural authority? One wonders.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to Wilfred C. Smith whose conception of "corporate critical self-awareness" is a source of inspiration for my idea of "communal critical self-consciousness" and to Rosanne Hall for searching criticisms of earlier versions of this paper.

ENDNOTES

¹Please refer to the quotation on the adjacent page which is from "The Great Learning," chap. 42 of the *Book of Rites*. For a standard translation, see Wing-tsit Chan, trans. and comp., *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 86–87.

²Senator William Bradley's remark on the occasion of the confirmation hearing of Robert Gates's nomination as the CIA director in the *Congressional Record—Senate*, vol. 137, no. 161, November 4, 1991, S 15838.

³*Ibid.*

⁴Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 23.

⁵*Genesis*, 1:28.

⁶Taylor, 23.

⁷Talcott Parsons, *The System of Modern Societies* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 114ff.

⁸Pierre Nora, "America and the French Intellectuals," *Dædalus* 107 (1) (Winter 1978): 327.

⁹S. N. Eisenstadt, "Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition," *Dædalus* 102 (1) (Winter 1973): 6.

¹⁰Friedrich A. von Hayek, *Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), and W. W. Bartley, III, ed., *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism* (London: Routledge, 1988).

- ¹¹Andrew J. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 31–44, 87–106, 133–151.
- ¹²Joyce Kallgren, “China in 1983: The Turmoil of Modernization,” *Asian Survey* 24 (1) (1984): 60–80. Also see Brantly Womack, “Modernization and Democratic Reform in China,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 44 (3) (1984): 417–440.
- ¹³For an example of this independent-mindedness, see David Kelly, “The Emergence of Humanism: Wang Ruoshui and the Critique of Socialist Alienation,” in Merle Goldman, et al. eds., *China’s Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 159–182.
- ¹⁴I am indebted to Professor Su Shaozhi for this information. As the director of the Marxist and Leninist Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Professor Su was instrumental in setting the agenda for a number of discussions.
- ¹⁵The main thrust of the editorial is a critique of theoretical dogmatism in favor of pragmatic adaptation to the concrete political and economic conditions of the twentieth century. The statement that Marx has been dead for more than 101 years is considered particularly provocative. *Renminribao* (*People’s Daily*) 7 December 1984, section 1.
- ¹⁶Quite a few students from the USSR expressed great admiration for China’s reform in informal discussions associated with my course on Confucian philosophy at Peking University in the spring of 1985.
- ¹⁷This historical allusion was intended to show that although Hu may have been humiliated by his dismissal, his death was a major historical event as monumental as the most revered sacred mountain.
- ¹⁸Ernest Gellner, *Plough, Sword, and Book: The Structure of Human History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 116.
- ¹⁹Oral presentations at the conference in commemoration of the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement (1919), organized by the *China Times* in New York, April 14–16, 1989.
- ²⁰Mao’s realism, correctly interpreted, is a recognition that right politics are superior to military might. Thus, having acknowledged the importance of the gun, Mao insisted: “Our principle is that the party commands the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command the party.” See Ellis Joffe, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in Chinese Officer Corps, 1949–1964* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 57.
- ²¹Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 645–662.
- ²²Lucian W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 213.
- ²³Tu Wei-ming, “Iconoclasm, Holistic Vision, and Patient Watchfulness: A Personal Reflection on the Modern Chinese Intellectual Quest,” *Dædalus* 116 (2) (Spring 1987): 75.
- ²⁴See Liu Binyan, *A Higher Kind of Loyalty*, trans. Zhu Hong (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990). For an early example of Liu’s spirit of protest, see Perry Link, ed., *People or Monsters?* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983).

- ²⁵For Wang's Marxist humanism, see Wang Ruoshui, *Wei rendaozhuyi bianhu*, (*In Defense of Humanism*) (Beijing: Sanlian, 1986).
- ²⁶Ray Huang, *China: A Macro History* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), 254–255.
- ²⁷*Ibid.*, 268.
- ²⁸Pye, 200.
- ²⁹Cheng Xian, *Tiananmen de fansi (Reflections on the Gate of Heavenly Peace)* (Hong Kong: Lizhi Publishers, 1990), 13–40.
- ³⁰“Deng Xiaoping's Remarks to Martial Law Officers on June 9,” in Han Minzhu, ed., *Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 369.
- ³¹Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 209–231.
- ³²Han Minzhu, 8.
- ³³*Ibid.* My translation of the original couplet is slightly different; I render the critical term *shi* as “affair” rather than “news.”
- ³⁴Merle Goldman, *Literary Dissent in Communist China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 25–27.
- ³⁵Merle Goldman, *China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 1–116.
- ³⁶*Ibid.*, 189–191, 234–235.
- ³⁷William T. de Bary, *The Trouble with Confucianism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 80–86.
- ³⁸Tu Wei-ming, “The Structure and Function of the Confucian Intellectual in Ancient China,” in S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York, 1987), 360–373.
- ³⁹He Baogang and David Kelly, “China's Civil Society and the Intellectuals,” unpublished manuscript, to appear in Robert Miller, ed., *The Development of Civil Society in Communist Systems* (London: Allen and Unwin, forthcoming), 3.
- ⁴⁰For a modern exposition of this idea, see Chan, 730–34.
- ⁴¹Han Minzhu, 83–85.
- ⁴²*Ibid.*, 137.
- ⁴³*Ibid.*, 87.
- ⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 200.
- ⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 221.
- ⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 258.
- ⁴⁷There are several eyewitness accounts that such notices were posted in the streets of Beijing. See Suzanne Ogden et al., eds., *China's Search for Democracy: The Student and Mass Movement of 1989* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), 301. I am

grateful to Nancy R. Hearst of the J. K. Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University for this reference.

⁴⁸Richard Baum, "Science and Culture in Contemporary China: The Roots of Retarded Modernization," *Asian Survey* 22 (December 1982): 1167.

⁴⁹Fang Lizhi, "China's Time Will Come," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (3) (Summer 1991): 50–53.

⁵⁰Leszek Kolakowski, "The Postrevolutionary Hangover," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (3) (Summer 1991): 72.

⁵¹Marie-Claire Bergère, *The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911–1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), trans. by Janet Lloyd from the 1986 French edition, 240.

⁵²*Ibid.*

⁵³He Baogang and David Kelly, 18.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 16.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 18.

⁵⁶Pye, 213.

⁵⁷Nora, 335.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

⁵⁹Gellner, 116.

⁶⁰Pye, 213.

⁶¹Robert A. Scalapino, "The U.S. and Asia: Future Prospects," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (5) (Winter 1991–1992): 23.

⁶²*Ibid.*, 25.

⁶³*Ibid.*, 21.

⁶⁴Han Minzhu, 20.

⁶⁵Scalapino, 25.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*

⁶⁷Bao Mi, *Huanghuo (The Yellow Peril)* (Ontario: Canada Mirror Books, 1991). For a brief report, see *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 January 1992, 1, 4.

⁶⁸The poem entitled "Vesuvius Volcano" was written by a student at the Beijing Languages Institute on April 24, 1989. Han Minzhu, 48.

⁶⁹*Shijieribao* (World journal), 19 December 1991, section 8.

⁷⁰Scalapino, 20–21.

⁷¹The conference sponsored by several research organizations in Hong Kong was held in Hong Kong, January 19–22, 1991. For a report on the planning of the conference, see *Shijieribo* (World journal) 30 December 1991, section 1.

⁷²*Shijieribao* (World journal), 19 December 1991, sec. 8.

⁷³I am indebted to Zhu Jiaming of M.I.T. for this information. For useful perspectives on this complex matter, see Barry Naughton, "Implications of the State Monopoly over Industry and its Relaxation," *Modern China* 18 (1) (January 1992): 14–41, and Ole Odgaard, "Inadequate and Inaccurate Chinese Statistics: The Case of Private Rural Enterprise," *China Information* 5 (3) (Winter 1990–1991): 29–38.

⁷⁴Pye, 213.

⁷⁵Scalapino, 33.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, 34.