Tu Wei-ming **Jen as a living metaphor in the Confucian Analects**

In a recent article surveying Chinese and Western interpretations of *jen* (humanity), Wing-tsit Chan maintains that Confucius in the *Analects* was the first to conceive of *jen* as the general virtue "which is basic, universal and the source of all specific vitues." "Although Confucius' concept of *jen* as the general virtue is unmistakable," Chan further observes, "he never defined it."[1] Actually Chan's explanatory remark that in the hierarchy of values in Confucian symbolism *jen* occupies the central position around which other cardinal virtues are ordered, although *jen* in itself is never specified, seems self-evidently true in light of traditional Chinese and Japanese exegees.

To my knowledge, philosophically the only serious challenge to this interpretive consensus is Herbert Fingarette's focused investigation on *li* as the "holy rite" in the "human community." The purpose of this article is to present a new inquiry into *jen* as a living metaphor, while bearing in mind Fingarette's highly provocative reflection on *Confucius—The Secular as Sacred*, in which the metaphor of an inner psychic life is thought to be not even a "rejected possibility" in the *Analects* and the way of Confucius' *jen* is understood as "where reciprocal good faith and respect are expressed through the specific forms defined in *li*."[2]

THE RHETORICAL SITUATION

To the modern inquirer who has been steeped in the art of argumentation, Confucius may appear to be "a prosaic and parochial moralizer," and his collected sayings "an archaic irrelevance."[3] This initial response is likely to become an unreflective fixity, if the inquirer is mainly concerned with philological issues as matters of fact.[4] Needless to say, a study geared only to explicating the stylistic nuances of the original text leaves many questions unasked. And since "unasked questions are unlikely to be answered,"[5] the impression that Confucius was an outmoded ethical teacher, the study of whom is only *historically significant*,[6] will remain persistent. In what sense can Confucius be understood and appreciated as, for example, in Fingarette's words, "a thinker with profound insight and with an imaginative vision of man equal in its grandeur to any I know"?[7]

To begin, I would suggest that the mode of articulation in the *Analects* is a form of what Wayne C. Booth has forcefully argued for as "the rhetoric of assent."[8] In such a rhetorical situation, the internal lines of communication are predicated on a view of human nature significantly different from that of the scientismic assertion that ideally man is a rational atomic mechanism in a universe that is value-free. Rather, the basic assumptions are as follows: human beings come into existence through symbolic interchange. We are

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"created in the process of sharing intentions, values, meanings; in fact more like each other than different, more valuable in our commonality than in our idiosyncrasies: not, in fact, anything at all when considered separately from our relations."[9] Viewed from this perspective, the whole world defined in terms of the polarities "individual" and "society" shifts: "even usage of words like *I*, *my*, *mine*, *self*, must be reconsidered, because the borderlines between the self and the other have either disappeared or shifted sharply."[10]

Perhaps, it is in this connection that Fingarette's perceptive observation becomes singularly pertinent:

> [T]he images of the inner man and of his inner conflict are not essential to a concept of man as a being whose dignity is the consummation of a life of subtlety and sophistication, a life in which human conduct can be intelligible in natural terms and yet be attuned to the sacred, a life in which the practical, the intellectual and the spiritual are equally revered and are harmonized in the one act—the act of *li*.[11]

Indeed, intent on underscoring the commonality, communicability, and community of the human situation, the rhetoric of assent affirms not only the malleability of human nature but also the perfectibility of undivided selves through group sharing and mutual exhortation. Yet this is neither a license for unbridled romantic assertion nor a belief in dogmatic scientistic manipulation, but an attempt to establish "a commonsensical defense of the way we naturally, inescapably, work upon each other,"[12] without resorting to the "clean linearity" of an argumentative procedure. Elsewhere, I have used the notion of "fiduciary community" as opposed to an "adversary system" in describing this kind of psychic as well as social ethos.[13]

The philosophical anthropology predicated on this rhetorical insight maintains that "[m]an is essentially a self-making-and-remaking, symbol-manipulating [worker], an exchanger of information, a communicator, a persuader and manipulator, an inquirer."[14] The symbolic exchange wherein self-identification and group awareness in both cognitive and affective senses take place thus becomes the primary human milieu. Against this background, the dialogical encounters not infrequently couched in analogical reasoning are by no means "an unsound form of the inductive argument."[15] For their persuasive power lies not in the straightness of a logical sequence devoid of emotion but in its appeal to common sense, good reasons, and a willingness to participate in the creation of sharable values.

Of course, as Wayne Booth observes, "we have no reason to assume that the world is rational in the sense of harmonizing all our 'local' values; in fact we know that at every moment it presents ... sharp clashes among good reasons."[16] Actually, there is no assumption in the *Analects* like the one found in the objectivists' claim that "all truly reasonable men will always finally agree."[17] On the contrary, it is taken for granted that reasonable men of diverse personalities will have differing visions of the Way. As I have pointed

out in my reflection on the Confucian perception of adulthood, "[s]ince the Way is not shown as a norm that establishes a fixed pattern of behavior, a person cannot measure the success or failure of his conduct in terms of the degree of approximation to an external ideal."[18] Consequently, "[e]ven among Confucius' closest disciples, the paths of self-realization are varied. Between Yen Hui's premature death and Tseng Tzu's longevity, there are numerous manifestations of adulthood."[19]

However, the multiplicity of paths in realizing the Way is not at all in conflict with the view that the pursuit of the Way necessitates a continuous process of symbolic exchange through the sharing of communally cherished values with other selves. The self as a center of relationships rather than as an isolatable individual is such a fundamental premise in the *Analects* that man as "an ultimately autonomous being" is unthinkable, and the manifestation of the authentic self is impossible "except in matrices of human converse."[20]

The conversations in the *Analects* so conceived are not merely instructive sayings of the Master but intersubjectively validated ideas, communal values exemplified by life experiences of the speakers in the act of *li*. Since the act of *li* entails the participation of the others, the rhetorical situation in the *Analects* is, in an existential sense, characterized not by the formula of the teacher speaking to the student but by the ethos in which the teacher answers in response to the student's concrete questioning. And the exchange as a whole echoes a deep-rooted concern, a tacit communal quest, for self-realization as a collaborative effort. Understandably, in the Confucian tradition, teaching (*chiao*) and learning (*hsüeh*) for both the teacher and the student are inseparable, indeed interchangeable.

THE SEMIOTIC STRUCTURE: JEN AS A SIGN

It is commonly accepted that etymologically *jen* consists of two parts, one a simple ideogram of a human figure, meaning the self, and the other with two horizontal strokes, suggesting human relations.[21] Peter Boodberg in "Semasiology of Some Primary Confucian Concepts," obviously following this interpretive tradition, proposes that *jen* be rendered as "co-humanity." And, based upon a phonological analysis of related words in ancient Chinese pronunciation, he further proposes that a root meaning of *jen* should be softness, weakness, and, I presume by implication, pliability.[22]

Boodberg's claims, far from being a novel reading of the classics, can be substantiated by the vast lore of Chinese and Japanese scholarship on the subject. According to a recent study on the evolution of *jen* in pre-Confucian times, the author summarizes her findings by identifying the original meanings of *jen* in terms of two semiotic foci: (1) as the tender aspect of human feelings, namely, love and (2) as an altruistic concern for others, and, thus a mature manifestation of humanity.[23] But in either case, *jen* functions as a particular virtue, often contrasted with other equally important virtues, such as *li* (pro-

priety), *hsin* (faithfulness), *i* (righteousness), *chih* (intelligence), and *yung* (bravery). Therefore, it is quite conceivable that a man of *jen* could be neither brave nor intelligent, for his tenderness may become a sign of weakness and his altruistic concern for others, an obstacle in achieving a realistic appraisal of the objective conditions.

The author then concludes that the concept of *jen* in the *Analects* seems to have been a crystallization of these two trends in the early Spring and Autumn period. In her words, the creative synthesis of Confucius skillfully integrates *jen* as "*ai-jen*" (love and care for others) and *jen* as "*ch'eng-jen*" (fully human or adult in the ethical sense).[24] Thus, in the *Analects*, *jen* is elevated to a general virtue, more embracing than any of the other core Confucian virtues. Surely, "love" remains a defining characteristic of *jen*, but as the scope of *jen* becomes qualitatively broadened, it is no longer possible to conceive of *jen* merely as a localized value. Indeed, a man of *jen* is necessarily brave and intelligent, although it is not at all impossible that a brave man or an intelligent man falls short of being a *jen* man. In a deeper sense, through the general virtue of *jen*, such values as bravery and intelligence are being transvaluated. Bravery and intelligence as contributing elements in the symbolic structure of *jen* must now be understand as courage and wisdom.

Genetic reasons aside, this quantum leap of intellectual sophistication is perhaps the main reason *jen*, in the *Analects*, appears to be discouragingly complex. Methodologically, it seems that one problem is particularly germane to the complexity of the semiotic structure of *jen*: let us call it the problem of linkage. Before undertaking a brief analysis of this problem, however, it should be noted from the outset that the lack of a definitional statement about what *jen* is in itself in the *Analects* must not be construed as the Master's deliberate heuristic device to hide an esoteric truth from his students: "My friends, I know you think that there is something I am keeping from you. There is nothing at all that I keep from you. There is nothing which I do that is not shown to you, my friends" (7:23). On the contrary, Confucius seems absolutely serious in his endeavor to transmit the true sense of *jen*, as he understood and experienced it, to his students. After all, as numerous scholars have already stated, it is *jen* rather than *chih*, *yung*, or *li* that really features prominently and uniquely in the *Analects*.

Although Confucius "rarely spoke of profit, fate, or *jen*," (9:1) his recorded remarks on *jen* by far surpass his comments on any other virtues in the *Analects*. Of course, each recorded articulation on the subject is but a clue to the all-inclusive virtue, or in Waley's words, the "mystic entity."[25] Among the hundred and five references to *jen* in 58 out of 499 chapters of the *Analects*,[26] there are, to be sure, statements that appear to be conflicting or paradoxical assertions. A mechanistic cataloging of these statements is not likely to develop a coherent interpretation of *jen*. A more elaborate strategy is certainly required.

First, we must not pass lightly over what seem to be only cliche virtues

ascribed to those who are thought to manifest *jen*: "courteous," "diligent," "faithful," "respectful," "broad," and "kind" (13:19, 14:5, 17:6). For these traditional virtues provide the map of common sense and good reasons on which *jen* is located.[27] However, the tenderness of *jen*, to be sharply differentiated from the accommodating and compromising character of the hyperhonest villager (*hsiang-yüan*), is also closely linked with such virtues as "brave," "steadfast," and "resolute." Accordingly only those of *jen* know how to love men and how to hate them (4:3), for the feelings of love and hate can be impartially expressed as fitting responses to concrete situations only by those who have reached the highest level of morality.[28] This is predicated on the moral principle that those who sincerely strive to become *jen* abstain from evil will (or, if you wish, hatred); as a result, they can respond to a value-laden and emotion-charged situation in a disinterested but compassionate manner. The paradox, rather than obscurity, is quite understandable in terms of Confucius' characterization of the hyperhonest villager as the spoiler of virtue (17:13). A man of *jen* refuses to tolerate evil because he has no evil will toward others; his ability to hate is thus a true indication that he has no penned up hatred in his heart.[29]

The problem of linkage is particularly pronounced when *jen* is connected with two other important concepts, *chih* and *li*. Our initial puzzlement over the precise relationship of *jen* to *chih* or *li* can be overcome, if *jen* is conceived of as a complex of attitude and disposition in which the other two important concepts are integral parts or contributing factors. In other words, *jen* is like a source in which symbolic exchange comes into existence. By implication, it is in *jen*'s "field of influence,"[30] so to speak, that the meanings of *chih* and *li* are shaped. They in turn enrich *jen*'s resourcefulness. Without stretching the point, I would suggest that the relationship of *jen* to *chih* or to *li* is analogous to the statement that "a man of *jen* certainly also possesses courage, but a brave man is not necessarily *jen*" (14:5). To be sure, in the courts of communal exchange, as exemplified in the rhetorical situation of the *Analects*, the presence of *jen* without *li* and *chih* is illegitimate. However, the examples of *li* as ritualism and *chih* as cleverness clearly indicate that *li* or *chih* without *jen*, while deplorable, is nevertheless conceivable. Thus, a man who is not *jen* can have nothing to do with *li* (3:3), because the true spirit of *li* is always grounded in *jen*.

Whether *jen* and *chih* are like "two wings, one supporting the other,"[31] in the Confucian ethical system, the two frequently appear as a pair (4:2, 6:21, 9:28, 12:22, 15:32, 14:30). It is true that the contrast between mountain, tranquility, and longevity symbolizing the man of *jen* on the one hand, and water, movement, and happiness symbolizing the man of *chih*, on the other (6:21), does give one the impression that *jen* and *chih* seem to represent two equally significant styles of life. Confucius' preference, however, becomes prefectly clear when he asserts that without *jen*, a man cannot for long endure

either adversity or prosperity and that those who are *jen* rest content in *jen*; those who are *chih* pursue *jen* with facility (4:2). The necessity for *jen* to sustain *chih* and the desirability for *chih* to reach *jen* is shown in a crucial passage that "even if a man's *chih* is sufficient for him to attain it, without *jen* to hold it, he will lose it again" (15:32).

Suggestively *chih* in the *Analects* may occasionally be put in a negative light to mean fragmented or nonessential knowledge (15:33); sometimes the absence of *chih* can convey a sense of receptivity and flexibility (9:7), and even its opposite, *yü* (stupidity or folly), may in extraordinary situations be applauded as a demonstration of inner strength (5:20). *Jen*, by contrast, is always understood as "Goodness" (Arthus Waley), "Human-heartedness" (E. R. Hughes), "Love" (Derk Bodde), "Benevolent Love" (H. H. Dubs), "Virtue" (H. G. Creel), and "Humanity" (W. T. Chan). The practice of qualifying *jen* with such adjectives as "false" (*chia*) and "womanish," (*fu-jen chih jen*) which do appear in later writings in ancient China, is completely absent in the *Analects*. In the light of the preceding discussion, it seems that, while *jen* and *chih* do appear as mutually complementary virtues in Confucian symbolism, *jen* is unquestionably a more essential characterization of the Confucian Way.

Therefore, it may not be farfetched to suggest that *jen* is in a subtle way linked up with virtually all other basic Confucian concepts. Yet its relation to any of them is neither obscure nor mystical. I believe that a systematic inquiry into each occurrence of the linkage problem should eventually yield the fruit of a coherent semiotic structure of *jen*. The matter involved is no less complex than what the scholarly tradition of *ko-i* has demonstrated. But through "matching concepts" or more dramatically, through a series of wrestlings with the meanings of each pair of ideas in terms of comparative analysis, *jen*'s true face should not be concealed for long.

At the present juncture, we may tentatively conclude: Confucius refused to grant *jen* to Tzu-lu despite his talents in political leadership and to Jan Ch'iu despite his virtuosity in state rituals (5:7); he also resisted the temptation to characterize the loyalty (*chung*) of Tzu-wen and the purity (*ch'ing*) of Ch'en Wen Tzu as *jen* (5:18), not because *jen* implies "an inner mysterious realm" but because *jen* symbolizes a holistic manifestation of humanity in its commonest and highest state of perfection.

THE SEMANTIC LOCUS: JEN AS A SYMBOL

When we shift our attention from the linkage problem to focus on *jen* as a problem in itself, we are easily struck by the assurance that *jen* is immediately present if desired: "Is *jen* far away? As soon as I want it, there it is right by me" (7:29). Also, we are told that although it is difficult to find one who really loves *jen*, each person has sufficient strength to pursue its course without relying upon external help (4:6). This sense of immediacy and infallibility assumes a new shape of meaning when, in Tseng Tzu's imagery, *jen* becomes a

heavy burden to be shouldered throughout one's entire life (8:7). Indeed, *jen* can be realized only after one has done what is difficult (6:20).

The paradoxical situation in which *jen* presents itself both as a given reality and as an inaccessible ideal is further complicated by a group of passages in the *Analects*, orienting our thoughts to the absolute seriousness with which *jen* is articulated. Thus, the *chün tzu* (profound person) is instructed never to abandon *jen* "even for the lapse of a single meal"; instead, "he is never so harried but that he cleaves to this; never so tottering but that he cleaves to this" (4:5). *Jen* must come before any other consideration (4:6); it is a supreme value more precious than one's own life and therefore an idea worth dying for (15:8).

Yet the pursuit of *jen* is never a lonely struggle. It is not a quest for inner truth or spiritual purity isolatable from an "outer" or public realm. From the *jen* perspective, "a man of humanity, wishing to establish his own character, also establishes the character of others, and wishing to fully manifest himself, also helps others to fully manifest themselves. The ability to take what is near at hand as an example may be called the method of realizing *jen*" (6:28). For the task of *jen*, far from being an internal, subjectivistic search for one's own individuality, depends as much on meaningful communal inquiry as on self-scrutiny.

Tseng Tzu's daily self-examination is a case in point. The effort of personal cultivation certainly suggests a spiritual-moral dimension not reducible to social considerations, but the three areas of concern—loyalty to others, faithfulness to friends, and commitment to learning (1:4), are so much an integral part of the "symbolic interchange" mentioned earlier that Master Tseng's message is clearly in the realm of human relations. The self so conceived is a kind of value-creating field in which the fiduciary community exists and is realized by a tradition of selves in continuous interaction with selves. It is in this connection, I believe, that Confucius insisted that true learning be specified as learning for the sake of the self (14:25).

However, an essential characterization of *jen* impels us to go beyond the behavioristic approach, no matter how comprehensive it purports to be. In fact, the reason *jen* seems to be "surrounded with paradox and mystery in the *Analects*"[32] is also relevant here. The four-word phrase, "*ke-chi fu-li*," wrongly rendered by Arthur Waley as "he who can himself submit to ritual,"[33] clearly shows that the attainment of *jen* involves both self-mastery and returning to ritual. The interpretation that "the man who can submit himself to *li* is *jen*" misses the point in a fundamental way.[34] And, by implication, the portrayal of *jen* as a disposition "after one has mastered the skills of action required by *li*" is probably an inadequate view of the linkage problem.[35] *Jen* is not simply "a matter of the person's deciding to submit to *li* (once he has the objective skill to do so);"[36] rather, it is a matter of inner strength and self-knowledge, symbolizing an inexhaustible source for creative communal expression.

The primacy of *jen* over *li* and the inseparability of *li* from *jen*, a thesis I

tried to develop in my study on "*li* as process of humanization,"[37] can be substantiated by Confucius' response to Lin Fang who asked about "the foundation of li." After having noted the importance of the question, the Master recommended that "in ceremonies, be thrifty rather than extravagant, and in funerals, be deeply sorrowful rather than shallow in sentiment" (3:4). Obviously the emphasis is not on role performance but on "the raw stuff of humanity." Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the Master was very pleased with Tzu-hsia when he understood that "just as the painting comes from the plain groundwork, ritual comes afterwards" (3:8).

The centrality of self-mastery to the practice of *jen* can be shown in Confucius' remark that "a man who is strong, resolute, simple, and slow to speak is near to *jen*" (13:27). In fact, notwithstanding the danger of psychologizing the *Analects*, it is vitally important to note that the text contains many ideas specifying that the mature personal stance is determined not merely by social approval but more importantly by personal integrity, as in freeing oneself from arbitrariness of opinion, dogmatism, obstinacy, and egoism (9:4). Accordingly, dispositional qualities resulting from spiritual-moral cultivation, such as cordiality, frankness, courteousness, temperance, and deference, are thought to be bases upon which proper human intercourse should be conducted (1:10). This particular concern for self-improvement clearly underlies Confucius' suggestion that looking out for faults is a way of recognizing *jen* (4:7). Needless to say, the vigilant way of overcoming one's moral and spiritual "sickness" is none other than constantly "looking within" (12:4).

It is in this sense, I think, that the controversial notion of *yu* (sorrow, worry, trouble, anxiousness) in the *Analects* does signify a "subjective state" not provable or demonstratable by ordinary hard tests.[38] In fact it is a reflection of personal knowledge or inner awareness, comparable to what Michael Polanyi calls a kind of indwelling.[39] Surely, *yu* is related to "the notion of objective uncertainty and unsettledness with possible ominous import,"[40] but it is much more than a matter of objective comportment. The characterization that the man of *jen* is not *yu* (9:28, 14:30) suggests, at least on the surface, that *yu* is the opposite of *jen*.[41] However, Confucius makes it clear that leaving virtue without proper cultivation, ignoring the task of learning, inability to change according to the words of the righteous, and failure in rectifying faults are example of his *yu* (7:3).

The context in which "the man of *jen* is not *yu*" occurs should put the issue in proper perspective. The two passages conveying essentially the same idea have a parallel syntactical structure: The wise are not perplexed; the brave are not fearful; the *jen* are not *yu*. To be sure, the brave are not fearful, but Confucius instructed the fearless Tzu-lu that his "associate must be able to approach difficulties with a sense of fear and eventually manage to succeed by strategy" (7:10). Similarly, since the person who is aware of his ignorance really knows (2:17), the wise is he who can put aside the points of which he

is in doubt (2:18). Along the same line of thinking, Confucius can speak of himself as so joyful and eager in learning and teaching that he forgets *yu* and that he is unaware of the onset of old age (7:18), precisely because he is *yu* with regard to the *Tao* and not to his private lot (15:31).[42]

The absence of the language and imagery of a purely psychological nature, or for that matter of a purely sociological nature, should not trouble us in the least. After all, recent developments in psychology and sociology as well as in philosophy in the West have already rendered the sharp contrast between "individual" and "society" not only undesirable but empirically unsound.

THE INTERPRETIVE TASK

It should become obvious by now that "the deepest meaning of the thought of Confucius and, paradoxically, its application to our time" is yet to be discerned by a systematic and open-minded inquiry into the *Analects*, neither as a corrective to nor as a confirmation of what is believed to be the newest developments in Anglo-American philosophy. Fingarette is certainly right in concluding that "[t]he noble man who most perfectly having given up self, ego, obstinacy and personal pride (9:4) follows not profit but the Way."[43] Nevertheless, I cannot help wondering whether such a man, having come to fruition as a person, is really a "Holy Vessel."[44] I would rather contend that it is precisely in the recognition that "the noble man is not a vessel" (2:12) that the interpretive task of true humanity in the *Analects* begins.

NOTES

1. Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese and Western Interpretations of Jen (Humanity)," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 2 (1975): 109.

2. Herbert Fingarette, *Confucius—The Secular as Sacred* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 42.

3. Ibid., vii. Of course, Fingarette makes it clear that this initial response of his to the *Analects* was short-lived.

4. The word "philological" is used here simply to designate the methods of linguistic analysis in the Ch'ien-Chia tradition of Ch'ing scholarship. I am aware that "philology" in terms of the principles of Böckh's *Philologie*, signifying "the re-cognition of that which was once cognized," can be philosophically meaningful. I am indebted to Masao Maruyama for this insight. See his *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*, trans. Mikiso Hane (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), xx.

5. Fingarette, *Confucius*, ix.

6. It is important to note that "historically significant" in the Levensonian sense is comparable to the idea of "traditionalistic," which means that the "heritage" in question has little modern relevance, because it is no longer a living tradition.

7. Fingarette, *Confucius*, vii.

8. Wayne C. Booth, *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent* (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1974). I am indebted to my colleague, Leonard Nathan, for calling my attention to this seminal work.

9. Ibid., p. 134.

10. Ibid. Also, Confer Fingarette, pp. 72–73.
11. Fingarette, *Confucius*, p. 36.
12. Booth, *Modern Dogma*, p. 141.
13. Tu Wei-ming, *Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Chung-Yung* (Honolulu, Hawaii: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976), pp. 52–99.
14. Booth, *Modern Dogma*, p. 136.
15. Based on Monroe C. Beardsley's *Thinking Straight* (New York, 1966), pp. 130–36; 284, quoted in Booth, *Modern Dogma*, p. 141.
16. Booth, *Modern Dogma*, p. 110.
17. Ibid., p. 111.
18. Tu Wei-ming, "The Confucian Perception of Adulthood," *Daedalus* 105, no. 2 (Spring, 1976): 110.
19. Ibid., 121.
20. Booth, *Modern Dogma*, p. 132. Also, see Fingarette, *Confucius*, p. 34.
21. I am aware that this etymological reading of the sign, traceable to the Han lexicographer Hsü Shen, may itself have been influenced by the Confucian tradition. See Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese and Western Interpretations," 108–109.
22. Peter Boodberg, "The Semasiology of Some Primary Confucian Concepts," *Philosophy East and West* 2, no. 4 (October, 1953): 317–332. For Chan's critical remarks on Boodberg's phonological analysis of *jen*, see Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese and Western Interpretations," 125.
23. Fang Ying-hsien, "Yüan-jen lun—tzu Shih Shu chih K'ung Tzu shih-t'ai kuan-nien chih yen-pien," *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 52, no. 3 (March, 1976): 22–34.
24. Ibid., 33.
25. Arthur Waley, *The Analects of Confucius* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1938), p. 28.
26. Based upon Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese and Western Interpretations," 107.
27. Cf. Fingarette, *Confucius*, p. 41.
28. Ibid., p. 40.
29. Thus, I cannot go along with Fingarette's observation that "it becomes all too evident that the concept *jen* is obscure." See ibid.
30. Booth, *Modern Dogma*, p. 126n.
31. Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 30.
32. Fingarette, *Confucius*, p. 37.
33. Waley, p. 162. See my critique of Waley's interpretive account, "The Creative Tension between Jen and Li," *Philosophy East and West* 18, no. 2 (April, 1968): 30–31.
34. Fingarette, *Confucius*, p. 42.
35. Ibid., p. 51.
36. Ibid.
37. "Li as Process of Humanization," *Philosophy East and West* 22, no. 2 (April, 1972): 188.
38. Booth, *Modern Dogma*, p. 116.
39. Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 173, 344, 378.
40. Fingarette, *Confucius*, p. 46.
41. Ibid., p. 43.
42. It is in this sense that I must take issue with Figarette's interpretive position, see ibid., pp. 45–47.
43. Ibid., p. 79.
44. Ibid.