Review Articles

RECONSTITUTING THE CONFUCIAN TRADITION*

Wing-tsit Chan suggests in his source book in Chinese philosophy that the influence Chu Hsi has exercised on Chinese thought measures up to that of Confucius.[1] He was the most authoritative interpreter of the Confucian tradition in the last eight centuries, and the effects of Chu Hsi's intellectual message still echo throughout East Asia. Indeed it may be claimed that prior to the impact of the West the predominant value-orientation in East Asian society and politics was Confucianism of the Chu Hsi tradition. Chu Hsi's ideas were not only intellectually appropriated but also practically implemented by the governments in Ming-Ch'ing China, Tokugawa Japan, and Yi Dynasty Korea. Without stretching the truth, it may be said that Chu Hsi's world view was a commanding ideology of the East Asian world in the premodern era.

Unfortunately no substantial translation of Chu Hsi's collected works into English has appeared since the publication of J. P. Bruce's free rendition of Chu Hsi's remarks on the human condition in 1922.[2] Bruce's other book, a descriptive account of *Chu Hsi and His Masters,* inadequate as it is, has remained a "standard reference" for more than half a century.[3] However, modern research on the Sung thinker has been growing steadily for decades in Hong Kong and Taiwan. With the publication of a series of original reflections on Chu Hsi's philosophical ideas by Fan Shou-k'ang[e], T'ang Chün-i[f] and Mou Tsung-san[g] in the last ten years,[4] the discourse on the subject among Chinese scholars has been elevated to a level of sophistication unprecedented in the study of Neo-Confucianism. Ch'ien Mu's comprehensive presentation of Chu Hsi's thought (*ssu-hsiang*[h]) and scholarship (*hsüeh-shu*[i]) adds a new dimension to this already impressive intellectual heritage.

Ch'ien Mu's systematic inquiry into Neo-Confucianism seems to have begun in the 1920's. His highly acclaimed short survey of Wang Yang-ming's[j] (1472–1529) thought published in 1930[5] contains a chapter on some of the key problem areas

* *Chu Tzu hsin hsüeh-an*[a] (A New Scholarly Record on Chu Hsi[b]) By Ch'ien Mu.[c] Hong Kong: San-min[d] Book Co., 1971. 5 vols. $NT 640.00.

[1] Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, 1963), p. 588.

[2] J. P. Bruce, trans., *The Philosophy of Human Nature by Chu Hsi* (London, 1922).

[3] J. P. Bruce, *Chu Hsi and His Masters* (London, 1923). Charles O. Hucker notes that it is "a standard reference on the development of Neo-Confucianism in Sung times and its culmination in the synthesis of Chu Hsi." See his *China: A Critical Bibliography* (The University of Arizona Press, 1962). To my knowledge, the only other substantial monographic study on Chu Hsi in English is Conrad M. Schirokauer's unpublished dissertation on the political thought and behavior of Chu Hsi (Stanford University, 1960). See Mr. Schirokauer's "Chu Hsi's Political Career," in *Confucian Personalities,* edited by Arthur Wright and Denis Twitchett (Stanford, 1962), pp. 162–188.

[4] Fan Shou-k'ang, *Chu Tzu chi ch'i che-hsüeh* (Chu Hsi and His Philosophy) (Taipei, 1964). T'ang Chün-i, *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh yuan-lun*[dk] 2 Vols (An Original Exposition of Chinese Philosophy) (Hong Kong, 1965–68). Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i yii hsing-t'i*[d1] 3 Vols (Mind and Human Nature) (Taipei, 1968).

[5] Ch'ien Mu, *Yang-ming hsüeh shu-yao*[d1] (A Summary of Yang-ming's Learning; reprint; Taipei, 1954).

in Sung Learning, among which Chu Hsi's method of self-cultivation stands out as a defining characteristic of Neo-Confucian thought. In general, however, Ch'ien Mu has been noted for his works in cultural history rather than in the history of ideas. In a lecture published in 1940 on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of Peking University, he presents a general survey of intellectual trends in the Sung-Yüan-Ming period (960–1644). The focus is on the social and cultural significance of the rise of Neo-Confucianism. This is also his main interest in the highly influential *Kuo-shih ta-kang*[k] (Outline of Chinese History; Shanghai, 1948). Even in his more specialized studies such as *Sung-Ming li-hsüeh kai-shu*[l] (Survey of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism; Taipei, 1957) and *Chung-kuo chin san-pei nien hsüeh-shu shih*[m] (A History of Chinese Thought in the Last Three Hundred Years; Chungking, 1945), the central concern is still with the social function of ideas. His purely academic analyses in *Hsien-Ch'in chu-tzu hsi-nien*[n] (Chronology of Pre-Ch'in Philosophers; Shanghai, 1936) and *Liu Hsiang Hsin fu-tzu nien-p'u*[o] (Chronological Biographies of Liu Hsiang and Liu Hsin; Chungking, 1947) give further evidence of this particular predilection. Therefore, his decision to undertake a comprehensive inquiry into Chu Hsi's thought and scholarship seems to be a new adventure, marking a significant departure from his career as a cultural historian for almost four decades.

According to his preface, Ch'ien Mu committed himself to the task of writing a comprehensive work on Chu Hsi in the summer of 1964 after he had resigned from the presidency of New Asia College in Hong Kong. He began his project by reading the *Collection of Literary Works by Master Chu* (*Chu Tzu wen-chi*[p]). After he had completed the 121 *chüan*[q] in a ten-month period of intensive study, he continued to work on the *Classified Conversations of Master Chu* (*Chu Tzu yü-lei*[r]) which consists of 140 *chüan*. To facilitate his research, he launched into an extensive note-taking which eventually led to the classification of more than three thousand items of "essential points" (*yao-chih*[s]). Having determined his major categories on the basis of primary sources, he proceeded to consult a massive amount of secondary sources and interpretive literature. The bulk of the manuscript was completed in November, 1969. In the following year, he wrote a long introductory essay trying to summarize the study of 58 chapters and over a million words.

Ch'ien Mu's five-volume study on Chu Hsi consists of two major parts. The part on thought (Vols. I and II) is further divided into sections on *li-ch'i*[t] (principle-material force) and *hsin-hsing*[u] (mind-human nature) and the part on scholarship (Vols IV and V) is further divided into sections on classics, history, and literature. Within the section on classics, special chapters are assigned to *I*[v] (*Book of Changes*), *Shih*[w] (*Book of Poetry*), *Shu*[x] (*Book of History*), *Ch'un-ch'iu*[y] (*Spring and Autumn Annals*), *Li*[z] (*Book of Rites*), and *Ssu-shu*[aa] (Four Books: *Analects, Book of Mencius, Great Learning* and *Doctrine of the Mean*).

Furthermore, a chapter each on *chiao-k'an*[ab] (textual verification), *pien-wei*[ac] (textual authentication), and *k'ao-chü*[ad] (empirical research) has been added. The study concludes with a chapter on Chu Hsi's miscellaneous reflections on divination, medicine, music, calligraphy, painting, and sciences. In addition to the parts on thought and scholarship, the entire Volume III is devoted to a study of Chu Hsi's intellectual development, and consists of a series of monographic studies on his pattern of spiritual maturation, his appropriation of philosophical insights from

the early Sung masters, his critique of his contemporaries, notably Lu Hsiang-shan[ae] (1139–1193), and his attack on Ch'an[af] Buddhism.

Suggestively Ch'ien Mu designates his study as a *hsüeh-an*[ag], which can be roughly rendered as a scholarly record intended to map out the intellectual biography and philosophical ideas of a thinker. The paradigmatic example of this genre is Huang Tsung-hsi's[ah] (1610–1695) *Ming-ju hsüeh-an*[ai] (A Scholarly Record of the Ming Confucians), which has been widely acclaimed as "the first notable attempt in China at systematic and critical intellectual history."[6] A salient feature of such a study is its professed intention to be representative. A *hsüeh-an* usually includes a biographic sketch of the thinker and a selection of his writings and sayings. The author's appreciation or criticism is frequently expressed indirectly in the succinct biographic remarks and in the method of selecting original sources. Ch'ien Mu's approach to Chu Hsi departs significantly from the *hsüeh-an* style in terms of its comprehensive coverage and elaborate organization, but his insistence on including many direct, sometimes lengthy, quotations from original sources and on making his judgements implicit in descriptive accounts is very much in the spirit of the *hsüeh-an* tradition.

Ch'ien Mu asserts in the very beginning of his study that Chu Hsi was not only the great synthesizer of all the major intellectual trends in the Neo-Confucian revival of the Northern Sung but the chief architect of the structure that Confucian thought has assumed ever since the thirteenth century. Accordingly, it is inadequate to study him mainly as a Southern Sung philosopher. Ch'ien Mu contends that just as the emergence of classical Confucianism resulted from a conscious response to the decline and fall of the feudal order of the Chou dynasty and led to a courageous struggle against dehumanizing forces in the Spring and Autumn period (722–481 B.C.), the rise of Neo-Confucianism should be conceived as the "awakening" (*chüeh-hsing*[aj]) of the Chinese literati in confronting the disintegration of the Chinese Empire and the challenge of Buddhism. Understandably the Neo-Confucian intellectuals were acutely aware of affairs of state and deeply committed to the perservation of what they believed to be the authentic classical and historical traditions. The reform movements of Fan Chung-yen[ak] (989–1052) and Wang An-shih[al] (1021–1086), the classical scholarship of Hu Yuan[am] (993–1059), Sun Fu[an] (992–1057), and Li Kou[ao] (1009–1059), the historiography of Ou-yang Hsiu[ap] (1007–1070) and Ssu-ma Kuang[aq] (1019–1086), and the literary writings of virtually all of them therefore constituted part of the heritage wherein Chu Hsi found his role and function in society.

However, it would be misleading to characterize Chu Hsi essentially as either a political philosopher or as a man of letters. Despite his profound influence in shaping the general direction of what may be called the official ideology of the later empires in China, Chu Hsi was never engaged wholly in matters of politics. To be sure classics and history absorbed much of his time; and he could well qualify as the leading classicist and historian of his generation. Scholarship, no matter how broadly it is conceived, was not his central concern. Rather, as a student of Li T'ung[ar] (1093–1163) who in turn had followed the teaching of Ch'eng I[as] (1033–1107), Chu Hsi dedicated himself to the transmission and interpretation of the Neo-Confucian

[6] Wm. T. de Bary, comp., *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (New York, 1960), pp. 585–586.

Way. It should be pointed out that, in his perception at the time, the Neo-Confucian Way, far from being a new creation of the Sung scholars, was the true representation of the teaching of Confucius and Mencius. The teaching, both an intellectual tradition and a spiritual message, was thought to have been distorted for more than a millennium before it began to be rectified in the vocations of Chou Tun-i[at] (1017–1073), Chang Tsai[au] (1020–1077), Ch'eng Hao[av] (1032–1085) and Ch'eng I. Chu Hsi's self-image as a "transmitter" and "interpreter" of the Confucian Way was therefore defined in terms of the ethico-religious orientation of the Northern Sung masters. Since Chu Hsi himself was instrumental in formulating the pattern of transmission and the method of interpretation, he was in a sense the maker of his own heritage.

Philosophically Chu Hsi was instrumental in establishing the "orthodox" line of Confucian transmission in the early Sung from Chou Tun-i through Chang Tsai, Ch'eng Hao, and Ch'eng I. His intention to harmonize the ideas of the Four Masters, however, gave the Confucian tradition a new complexion, which seems hardly recognizable purely in terms of the Northern Sung revival. This is of course not to suggest that Chu Hsi had drastically departed from the teachings of his predecessors. In fact his originality lay in his ability to integrate particular insights into a comprehensive structure, recapitulating all the major concepts in Neo-Confucianism up to his time. And this was not done by constructing an abstract system based on the available ideas of the early Sung thinkers but by "digging" deeply into their problem areas, sharing their agonies, and living through the pitfalls they had encountered. Chu Hsi's intellectual endeavor was not a painless appropriation of the insights of other men but a continuous quest for experiential understanding of the best minds in his chosen tradition. This becomes most evident in a series of dialogues he had with his students over a period of almost thirty years. Ch'ien Mu is absolutely correct in maintaining that the *Collected Conversations* must be consulted in any serious attempt to study Chu Hsi, the philosopher, in action. Thus in his analysis of Chu Hsi's thought the *Conversations* are extensively quoted.

The part on thought mainly consists of selections from the original sources which are arranged according to subject matter. The author's comments are interspersed with direct quotations, in a manner reminiscent of the format in traditional scholarship. The study is organized around a number of topical ideas. On the surface, they seem to be no more than labels under which relevant issues are glued. The first reading does give one the impression that the headings are used simply for identification. An examination of the table of contents seems to confirm the suspicion that the development from one chapter to the other is often haphazard and the sequential order in general is not apparent. One at first wonders why Ch'ien Mu did not choose to improve his overall design by arranging his material in categories such as psychology, society, polity, religion, and philosophy. One could further suggest that he divide his category of philosophy, for example, into discrete units such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and the like. However, the imposition of a modern classification of knowledge upon a body of literature in Neo-Confucian China is hardly justifiable. In fact the issue lies deeper than simply the problem of taxonomy.

Ch'ien Mu's comments on the key concepts that structure his presentation are

not textual studies but heuristic devices, which guide the reader to appreciate Chu Hsi's thought in a spirit of discovery. Although no easily recognizable design is apparent, his method does help to map out the major areas of concern in Chu Hsi's philosophy. Of course the reader may want to use the work simply as a reference book. For it contains a wealth of data on a variety of subjects. And it is certainly the most comprehensive study on Chu Hsi's thought in the Chinese language to this date. As a research tool, however, it seems unyieldingly difficult to use. For example, there is little attempt at cross reference. Even the index at the end is helpful only to those who are familiar with the material. The book is certainly not intended to be an encyclopedic account of Chu Hsi's thought. As the author's experiential understanding of Chu Hsi, it is based on judgments of personal knowledge rather than on a set of preconceived objective criteria. Therefore, it is quite remarkable that underlying the thirty-five chapters involving Ch'ien Mu's reflections on more than fifty key concepts selected from the Master's *Collected Literary Works* and *Classified Conversations,* is a sense of unity very much in the mode of Neo-Confucian thinking.

Actually Ch'ien Mu's approach in this section is quite compatible with Chu Hsi's own task of compiling an anthology of the writings and sayings of the four Northern Sung masters in *Chin-ssu lu*[aw] (Reflections on Things at Hand). The two basic categories, *li-ch'i* and *hsin-hsing,* are often rendered by modern scholars and by Ch'ien in his preface as metaphysics and philosophy of life; the former includes ontological and cosmological issues whereas the latter is primarily concerned with moral problems. It should be noted, however, that these categories are used generically to distinguish two mutually complementary spheres of thought. Apparently Ch'ien Mu is not grim about their technical meanings. To be sure issues such as *yin-yang*[ax] (female and male principles) and *kuei-shen*[ay] (negative and positive spiritual forces) are naturally classified under metaphysics. But with the inclusion of concepts such as *t'ien-li*[az] and *jen-yü*[ba] (heavenly principle and human desires), *shan-o*[bb] (good and evil), and *sheng-hsien*[bc] (sage and worthy), the classificatory scheme does appear to be arbitrary. Fortunately, in the main text, Ch'ien follows Chu Hsi's precedent and designates the two sections on thought as principle-material force and mind-human nature. It is therefore legitimate to consider *tao-ch'i*[bd] (general principle and concrete thing), *t'i-yung*[be] (substance and function), and even *ming*[bf] (destiny) as integral parts of the discussions on principle and material force. Similarly it makes sense to take into account problems such as *chung-shu*[bg] (truthfulness and considerateness), *chih-hsing*[bh] (knowledge and action), and *ch'eng-ssu*[bi] (sincerity and cogitation) in a general study of mind and human nature. Since Chu Hsi's interests were never purely speculative, even overt cosmological issues such as *yin* and *yang* necessarily lead to moral considerations. It is only for the sake of expediency that discrete categories are assigned.

A salient feature of Ch'ien Mu's study on Chu Hsi's thought is his insistence on the centrality of the concept of mind. In his general discussion of Chu Hsi's views on mind and principle, he notes that the emphasis clearly seems to have been placed upon the former. Contrary to the prevalent opinion that Chu Hsi, as a true heir of Ch'eng I, was mainly concerned with the dimension of principle, Ch'ien Mu suggests that Chu Hsi's teaching can even be characterized as a form of *hsin-hsüeh*[bj] (school of mind). Thus in addition to the chapter on the relationship between mind and

principle, Ch'ien Mu devotes no fewer than seven chapters exclusively to the discussion of mind. The issue of mind plays a predominant role in many other chapters as well. Ch'ien Mu's interpretation certainly has far-reaching implications. For one thing, it presents a serious challenge to the firm belief, held by eminent scholars such as Fung Yu-lan[bk], that the Neo-Confucian tradition can be meaningfully divided into *Li-hsüeh*[bl] (School of Principle) and *Hsin-hsüeh*. According to Fung's interpretation, Chu Hsi was the greatest architect of *Li-hsüeh* whereas his rival, Lu Hsiang-shan was the most formidable defender of *Hsin-hsüeh*. Ch'ien Mu argues rather convincingly that the dichotomy of mind and principle in this particular connection may be helpful to understand the spiritual thrust of Lu Hsiang-shan, but it is totally inadequate as an attempt to appreciate Chu Hsi. In the light of recent studies by Mou Tsung-san and T'ang Chün-i, the conventional division of the Neo-Confucian tradition into the Ch'eng-Chu[bm] School and Lu-Wang[bn] School appears not only simple-minded but dangerously misleading. Ch'ien Mu further demonstrates that to differentiate Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan in terms of the distinction between principle and mind is factually incorrect and theoretically unsound. Of course this is not intended to blur the fundamental differences between Chu and Lu. It simply rejects the conventional explanation of such differences.

Ch'ien Mu shows in his careful study that throughout his life Chu Hsi was deeply immersed in understanding the divergent aspects of the mind. Ever since his meditative thinking on the problem of the mind in his late twenties, Chu Hsi had been continuously engaged in the task of developing a comprehensive vision of the mind. He first sought to grasp the essence of the mind through inner experience. After a bitter struggle to free himself from the subtle influences of Ch'an, he made clear analytical distinctions between the Confucian perception of mind and the Buddhist approach to mind. He maintained that the Confucian Tao is in the last analysis transmitting the minds of the sages. However, unlike the transmission of the mind in Ch'an, the sagely mind has both a transcendent reference and a cultural dimension. In his discussion of the human mind (*jen-hsin*[bo]) and ontological mind (*tao-hsin*[bp]), he signified that the human mind, conditioned by the "self-centeredness of the material being" (*hsing-ch'i chih ssu*[bq]), can be transformed through moral cultivation to become identified with the ontological mind. Such an identification enables the ontological mind, which is the true basis of humanity, to manifest the "heavenly principle" in human affairs. It is therefore important for one to cultivate the mind so that, despite the inherent limitation of the physical self, it can "embody" principle, which is the ultimate ground of human nature. It was in this connection that Chu Hsi emphasized the "manifested" (*i-fa*[br]) and "unmanifested" (*wei-fa*[bs]) states of the mind and on the "spiritual nourishment" (*han-yang*[bt]) and "reflective examination" (*hsing-ch'a*[bu]) of the mind. Indeed, his reflections on "seriousness" (*ching*[bv]), "quietude" (*ching*[bw]), and "self-control" (*k'e-chi*[bx]) are also to be understood in reference to his concept of mind.

Accordingly, the famous debate between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan at the Goose Lake Temple in 1175 was not on the choice between mind and principle. Rather, it was a debate on the two different perceptions of mind. To Lu, mind is principle. Moral cultivation involves no more than the "simple and easy" (*i-chien*[by]) effort of recovering one's original mind. The process of becoming a sage can be carried out by making an inner decision to establish that which is great in each human

being. To honor the irreducible humanity in one's own nature is the direct and fundamental way of self-realization. Chu, on the other hand, contended that although the ontological mind embodies the principle, the human mind is precariously prone to wrongdoing. While he agreed with Lu that human nature is good, he insisted that the principle inherent in human nature is not identical with the mind. When the human mind is imbued with selfish desires, it can easily render one's inner goodness inoperative. The cultivation of the mind, which includes systematic study and continuous inquiry, is therefore an unceasing process of self-transformation. Specifically, through efforts such as the "investigation of things" (*ko-wu*[bz]), a human being can fundamentally transform his physical self and become one not only with his fellow men but also with the "Ultimate Reality" (*t'ai-chi*[ca]).

By making subtle, analytical distinctions in the concept of mind, Chu Hsi developed a sophisticated theory of human nature without alienating himself from the Mencian image of man. Particularly notable was his ingenious appropriation of the idea of *ch'i-chih chih hsing*[cb] (physical nature) into his highly integrated system of philosophical anthropology. The idea, first formulated by Chang Tsai and brought to fruition by the Ch'eng Brothers, seeks to establish the thesis that material force, such as physical endowments and human desires, is existentially inseparable from principle. Although the original nature of man manifests itself in principle, the human mind is necessarily an integral part of material force. It is therefore incomplete to stress the goodness of man as an ontological basis for self-realization. Unless the actual *condition humaine,* a mixture of moral propensity and egoistic demands, is also fully taken into account, an idealistic attachment to man's inner greatness can easily lead one astray. As Ch'ien Mu points out, this is the main reason why Chu Hsi put so much emphasis on the concept of the "investigation of things." Without the persistent effort of learning, Chu Hsi would argue, man cannot in a truly experiential sense become what he ought to be. For the difficulty lies not in the "oneness of the fundamental principle" (*li-i*[cc]) but in the "multiplicity of its concrete manifestations." (*fen-shu*[cd]).

To demonstrate that Chu Hsi was indeed the great synthesizer who masterfully orchestrated all the major philosophical motifs of the Northern Sung masters and created an awe-inspiring composition of his own, Ch'ien Mu first takes pains to delineate the intellectual genealogy which provided Chu Hsi with a unique access to the Northern Sung tradition as a whole. In addition to the Four Masters, we should also note Chu Hsi's relationship to Shao Yung[ce] (1011-1077) and Ssu-ma Kuang. Although Chu Hsi's philosophical system was mainly inspired by Chou Tun-i, Chang Tsai, and the Ch'eng Brothers, for his comprehensive view of Sung cosmology and historiography he was indebted to Shao and Ssu-ma. Thus in his veneration of his intellectual forefathers he never failed to pay special tribute to the "Six Teachers" (*liu hsien-sheng*[cf]). Nevertheless, Chu Hsi's primary commitment seems to have been to Ch'eng I. This was partly due to the connection through his teacher Li T'ung. Thus in his *Conversations,* Chu Hsi makes many extensive comments not only on Ch'eng I but also on his disciples. Since the *Conversations* include records only after Chu Hsi was forty years old and the majority of them consist of post-sixty sayings, they very much reflect his mature thoughts. As Ch'ien Mu points out, Chu Hsi was sometimes highly critical of Ch'eng I's followers, such as Yu Tso[cg] (1053–1132), Yang Shih[ch] (1053–1135) and Hsieh Liang-tso[ci] (1050–1103). This is certainly

true in his advanced age. The fact that Chu Hsi was deeply concerned about their interpretations of Master Ch'eng's teaching, however, seems also to indicate that he had seriously studied each of them in his formative years.

Although the formation of Chu Hsi's great synthesis can be perceived as a series of conscious responses to the root concepts of the Northern Sung masters, his intellectual dynamics owed much to his intense dialogues with contemporary thinkers as well. Especially noteworthy was his association with Chang Nan-hsien[cj] (1133–1180) and his associates. Chang, a prominent disciple of Hu Wu-feng[ck] (1105–1155), was instrumental in bringing on one of the most significant philosophical exchanges in Southern Sung. The exchange centered around Hu's treatise on *Understanding Words* (*Chih-yen*[cl]) which expounds, among other theses, the unity of mind and human nature. After many discussions with Chang Nan-hsien and continuous correspondence with Chang's followers afterwards, Chu Hsi was able to argue in the tradition of Ch'eng I that human nature is the same as principle but not identical with mind. Chu Hsi's final triumph in bringing over the Hunan scholars to his philosophical position marked an important stage in his intellectual growth. Equally important was his friendship with Lü Tsu-ch'ien[cm] (1137–1181), co-compiler of *Reflections on Things at Hand*. As the leader of one of the outstanding currents of thought at this time, Lü advocated a form of "practical learning," which later featured prominently in the Chekiang School of Neo-Confucianism. As James T.C. Liu has pointed out in a recent monograph, Lü's students played a key role in persuading the court to accept Neo-Confucianism as the state orthodoxy.[7] A direct result of this policy was the canonization of Chu Hsi as the last and only Southern Sung thinker in the line of transmission of the Confucian Tao. Lü was also responsible for arranging the famous debate between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan at the Goose Lake Temple.

Chu Hsi's short but intense personal confrontation with Lu Hsiang-shan has been recognized by intellectual historians as one of the most significant landmarks in the development of Neo-Confucian thought. It has also been taken as the basis for the assertion that Sung Learning can be meaningfully divided into the Chu Hsi School of Principle and the Lu Hsiang-shan School of Mind. Even though we consider the dichotomy, as a scheme of classification, both simplistic and misleading, the issues involved in the confrontation undoubtedly have many far-reaching implications. An examination of the fundamental points of contention has thus become a well-liked subject of study among students of Chinese philosophy. Indeed, as one of the most seriously researched topics in Neo-Confucianism, the "dissimilarity and compatibility between Chu and Lu" (Chu-Lu *i-t'ung*[cn]) features prominently in virtually all general surveys on Sung Learning. In Ch'ien Mu's work, more than a quarter of Volume III is concerned exclusively with this problem.

Lu accused Chu of having committed the fallacy of putting too much emphasis on book learning which leads to a fragmentary understanding of the mind. Chu responded that a gradual process of self-cultivation is essential to a real appreciation of the mind. Underlying the difference, however, is more than the conflict between sudden enlightenment and gradual enlightenment. It is also the conflict between the

[7] James T. C. Liu, "How Did a Neo-Confucian School Become the State Orthodoxy?" in *Philosophy East and West* XXIII, No. 4 (October 1973), pp. 483–505.

perception of mind as the authentic manifestation of principle and thus the ultimate ground as well as the actual faculty of self-realization and the perception of mind as the synthesis of human nature and human feelings (a mixture of principle and material force) and thus the actual faculty but not the ultimate ground of self-realization. While Lu insisted upon the self-sufficiency of the human mind, Chu Hsi had serious doubts about the claim that since every human mind is identical with the mind of the sage, self-realization involves no more than a simple and direct process of inner spiritual transformation.

At the time of the Goose Lake Temple debate, Chu Hsi was already in his late forties, whereas Lu Hsiang-shan was only thirty six years old. As Ch'ien Mu points out, by then Chu had completed more than a dozen books on Confucian classics and on early Sung Confucianism; he had also gone through years of intellectual struggle with the Hunan and Chekiang scholars. Although he was well disposed to accommodate Lu's position, he was quite taken aback by the arrogance and the uncompromising attitude of the young thinker, who was to become the leader of the Kiangsi School. However, Chu and Lu maintained a long and cordial friendship after the debate. Their intellectual discussions through correspondence also continued for many years. In 1181, Chu Hsi invited Lu Hsiang-shan to present a lecture at his famous White Deer Grotto Academy. Lu's talk on the distinction between righteous decisions and utilitarian motives marked an important event in the Academy and received high praise from Chu. Then a series of accidental events adversely affected their friendship. Their relation deteriorated seriously over the quarrel on Chou Tun-i's *T'ai-chi-t'u shuo*[co] (Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate) in 1188, almost fourteen years after the debate. Four years later Lu Hsiang-shan died. The alleged animosity between Chu and Lu was later intensified by a continuous feud between their disciples. However, Chu's intellectual influence was so pervasive that subsequent generations of Confucian thinkers were overwhelmed by his subtly constructed and freshly invigorated philosophy. Lu's teaching as a result failed to make an important impact on the minds of either the Yüan (1271–1368) or the early Ming (1368–1644) scholars.

Our perception of the phenomenon is somewhat confounded by the emergence of Wang Yang-ming as a brilliant spokesman for Confucianism in the sixteenth century. His conscious choice to revitalize the thought of Lu Hsiang-shan again ignited the debate which led to a substantial reformulation of the pattern of intellectual development in China in the premodern period. Wang Yang-ming, however, fully acknowledged that it was really Chu Hsi's intellectual challenge that prompted his rethinking on Confucianism. In fact, he was himself so much persuaded by the power of Chu Hsi's thought that for quite a while he strongly believed that, despite apparent incongruence, his philosophical orientation was in genuine agreement with Chu Hsi's "final words." It is therefore, fitting for Ch'ien Mu to include a critical analysis of Wang Yang-ming's highly controversial compilation of the so-called *Chu Tzu wan-nien ting-lun*[cp] (Chu Hsi's Final Words in Later Years). Although some philosophical issues remain unanswered, Ch'ien has certainly dispelled for us a great deal of historical and textual confusion.

Ch'ien Mu's discussion on Chu Hsi's scholarship (Volumes IV and V) contains many marvellous observations. Especially remarkable are his thoughtful assertion that Chu Hsi's commentaries on the classics are significantly different from those of

the Ch'eng Brothers and his detailed analysis of Chu Hsi's historical vision. The former seriously challenges the conventional belief that Chu, as a faithful follower of Ch'eng I, rarely departed from the *Surviving Works* (*I-shu*[cq]) of the two Ch'engs. The latter substantiates a claim by recent scholars, such as Yü Ying-shih,[cr] that Chu Hsi's historiography profoundly influenced not only historians in the Ming but also Han scholars in the Ch'ing (1644–1912).[8] In addition, Ch'ien Mu argues rather convincingly against the prevalent opinion that Chu Hsi, unlike his predecessors, regarded the *Book of Changes* as primarily for divination. Actually Chu Hsi criticized Ch'eng I's attempt to study the *Changes* purely as a philosophical treatise because he believed that since the book originated as a set of prognostic practices, it is important to appreciate its philosophical import in the light of its divinatory structure. Therefore, Chu Hsi took the "Judgements" of the hexagrams seriously as bases for rediscovering the "original meanings" (*pen-i*[cs]) of the ancient authors. Chu Hsi might have failed to combine the two dimensions in a manner satisfactory to himself, but it seems clear that his intention was to arrive at a synthesis of the *hsiang-shu*[ct] (images and numbers, divinatory) and the *i-li*[cu] (meaning and principle, philosophical) traditions of the *Book of Changes*.

Chu Hsi's vigorous attempt to study the *Book of Poetry* as a reservoir of aesthetic insights as well as a treasury of moral lessons is brought to life by Ch'ien Mu's skillful selection of pertinent quotations and anecdotes to illustrate his point. For Master Chu, the *Poetry* must be read and experienced before it can be objectively analyzed. To enable the commentator to see the poem as a highly condensed form of articulation, he suggested that it be recited forty to fifty times as a prerequisite for launching any critical study of it. Recitation in this connection is not at all unreasoned rote learning; it is intended to cultivate a sensitivity, to appreciate the nuance between lines, and to apprehend the inner structure of the poem. After some personal knowledge of the poem has been acquired, Chu Hsi then recommended comparative study of available commentaries. Such a study should be followed by another thirty to forty recitative exercises. An experiential understanding of the "flow" of a poem can be attained only by a constant interplay between these two types of learning. Thus, Chu Hsi was able to chart a new course for the study of the *Poetry* by transcending the moralism of centuries of traditional scholarship on the subject. His independence of mind was further evidenced by a series of critical remarks on the *Book of History* and *Spring and Autumn Annals*. To him they both contain a great deal of outmoded and cryptic material. He even warned his students not to waste too much time on them.

Ch'ien Mu shows, in a masterful treatment of original sources, that Chu Hsi's life-long commitment to the *Book of Rites* was diametrically opposed to his ambivalent attitudes toward the other two classics. According to a statement in the *Classified Conversations,* Chu Hsi began his study of *chia-li*[cv] (family rituals) when he was not yet twenty years old. His interest in this area remained strong throughout his life, and intensified after the death of his mother in the winter of 1175, several

[8] Yü Ying-shih, "*Ts'ung Sung-Ming ju-hsüeh ti fa-chan lun Ch'ing-tai ssu-hsiang shih*[dm]" ("Ch'ing Thought as Seen Through the Development of Sung-Ming Confucianism,") in *Chung-kuo hsüeh-jen*[dn] (Chinese Scholar) 2 (September 1970), pp. 19–41. This is the first part of a two-part article. The subtitle is "*Sung-Ming ju-hsüeh chung chih-shih chu-i ti ch'uan-t'ung*[do]" ("The Tradition of Intellectualism in Sung-Ming Confucianism.")

months after the Goose Lake Temple debate. However, concern for family rituals was only a part of his overall interest in *Rites*. To him the study of rituals involved much more than a reconstruction of ceremonial practices in the Confucian tradition. It was also an attempt to provide a comprehensive guide for social behavior. Ritualization in this connection was thought to be the actualization of personality ideals through the transforming powers of moral persuasion. In 1194, Chu Hsi memorialized the throne to have an institute established for the exclusive study of the *Rites*. He was prepared, with the help of a dozen former students, to assume the responsibility for such a task. The purpose was to assist the scholar-officials in fostering a sense of "real learning" (*shih-hsüeh*[cw]), which could eventually be applied to political affairs. Although Chu Hsi's proposal was never acted upon by the court, he continued to work on his own. As Ch'ien Mu points out, Chu Hsi wrote three letters on the day before his death and two of them were instructions to his students concerning the continuation of his work on the *Rites*.

By identifying important pieces of evidence, hitherto unrecognized by scholars in the field, Ch'ien Mu persuasively argues that the later controversy on the so-called *Chu Tzu chia-li*[cx] (*Family Rituals by Chu Tzu*), which prompted thinkers such as Yen Yuan[cy] (1635–1704) to attack the ritualism of the Ch'eng-Chu School, was mainly due to the posthumous publication of an incomplete text of this work. It was, therefore, not so much a reflection of Chu Hsi's mature thought as an indication of what he might have done in youth. Of course we cannot be sure about the story that the manuscript had been lost for years, only to be found shortly after the Master died. But Ch'ien Mu's explanation seems more convincing than Wang Mou-hung's[cz] (1668–1741) suggestion that the whole thing was a fabrication.[9] For Chu Hsi not only mentioned this particular project to his friends and students but also alluded to its format in several of his letters. What Chu Hsi really had in mind was not a new compilation of family rituals but a collaborative anthology based upon the works by Ssu-ma Kuang and Ch'eng I. This is reminiscent of Chu Hsi's other joint adventures such as *T'ung-chien kang-mu*[da] (*Outline and Digest of the General Mirror*). However, unlike his works in history, Chu Hsi's reflections on the *Rites* significantly departed from the main thrust of classical scholarship in Northern Sung. Of the three major texts on Confucian rituals, known as the *san-li*[db] (three books on rites), he regarded *I-li*[dc] as the root, *Li-chi*[dd] as the branches, and *Chou-li*[de] as a self-sufficient monograph on ancient institutions. This further testifies to the fact that Chu Hsi's judgement was often based upon his own perception of the given tradition and not necessarily on the established authority of his time. Had he followed the instructions of the Northern Sung scholars, he would have focused his attention on *Chou-li* and *Li-chi* rather than on the more obscure text of *I-li*.

Therefore, Chu Hsi's serious efforts to revitalize the tradition involved creative adaptation as well as faithful interpretation. His relationship to Confucianism in general and Northern Sung Learning in particular was a dialectic one. Although his self-image, like that of Confucius, was to be a transmitter rather than a maker, his conscious attempt to "continue" (*chi*[df]) the "transmission of the Way" (*tao-t'ung*[dg]) frequently led to a fundamental restructuring of the tradition. However, it

[9] Wang Mou-hung, *Chu Tzu nien-p'u k'ao-i*[dp] (A Critical Examination of Chu Hsi's Chronological Biography) (*Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng*[dq] edition, 1937), pp. 263–268.

only scratches the surface to suggest that Chu Hsi had inadvertently formed a tradition of his own, while ostensibly allying himself with the past. For what he really "created" was the cumulative result of a series of penetrating inquiries into the leading minds of the Confucian tradition as a whole. Indeed, his immersion in the tradition was so profound and his impact on it so great that it is extremely difficult to make subtle distinctions between the original direction of the tradition before the "immersion" and its newly assumed orientation after the "impact." For Chu Hsi's creativity was inseparable from his traditionality.

An example of this phenomenon is found in Chu Hsi's conscientious studies on the Four Books. As Ch'ien Mu points out, discussions on the Four Books constitute more than one third of the entire *Classified Conversations,* whereas references to the Five Classics are numbered fewer than half of those to the Four Books. Actually Chu Hsi was instrumental in the formation of the Four Books. Wing-tsit Chan characterizes this particular undertaking as Chu Hsi's "most radical innovation."[10] In brief, what he did was to select the *Great Learning* and the *Doctrine of the Mean* (two chapters of the *Book of Rites*), and group them together with the *Analects* and the *Book of Mencius,* as the Four Books. He then wrote thoughtful commentaries on them, interpreted them as an integrated philosophy, and made them the core of Confucian teaching. Since the Four Books, together with Chu Hsi's commentaries, were accepted by the government as the basis of the civil service examinations from 1313 to 1905, "they have exercised far greater influence on Chinese life and thought in the last six hundred years than any other Classic." It was mainly through institutional support of this kind that Chu Hsi's fame also spread to Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. In the light of the above, what Chu Hsi had actually brought about was no less than *reconstituting the Confucian tradition.*

Nevertheless, Chu Hsi's radical innovation was not at all intended to depart from the tradition. On the contrary, he was dedicated to the continuation of the authentic line of transmission and absolutely serious about understanding the true teaching of the sages. His commentaries were thus designed to elicit the inner meanings of the original texts. In Chu Hsi's own perception, they were records of his continuous struggle to understand word by word what the sages really tried to convey. Writing a commentary in this connection was much more than a scholarly enterprise; it demanded the participation of the entire body and mind. Chu Hsi repeatedly remarked that the strenuous task sapped much of his "bitter strength." His commentaries were to him serious "dialogues" with Confucius and Mencius: "the sage utters a word as a word, I weigh and measure it with a completely impartial mind. Without any trace of subjective imposition. I simply follow its drift." This state of selfless appreciation of the words of the sages was by no means easy to attain. After numerous attempts to revise his commentaries on the Four Books, which represented almost three decades of intensive study so that "not a single character can be added or subtracted," Chu Hsi stated, "Only now, at sixty-one, have I arrived at an experiential understanding (of the Four Books). Had I died last year, I would have had all my pains for nothing." Even then, Ch'ien Mu notes, Chu Hsi did not cease to improve his work. It is well-known that his last attempt,

[10] Wing-tsit Chan, p. 589.

a change of three characters in his commentary on the *Great Learning,* was made only three days before his death.

Ch'ien Mu has certainly made a significant contribution to interpretive scholarship on Chu Hsi. Not since the publication of Wang Mou-hung's *Chu Tzu nien-p'u*[dh] (Chronological Biography of Chu Hsi) in the eighteenth century, have Chu Hsi's thought and scholarship been studied so comprehensively and conscientiously in the Chinese language. The image of Chu Hsi, as presented in the five-volume study, has an integrity rarely found in sinological literature. Ch'ien Mu's holistic vision will undoubtedly provide criteria for judging a variety of partial views on Chu Hsi for years to come. To be sure, Chu Hsi's philosophy is more perceptively analyzed in Mou Tsung-san's *Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i*[di] (Mind and Human Nature), and his life history is more vividly presented in Wang Mou-hung's *Chronological Biography,* but it is in Ch'ien Mu that we find the entire texture of Chu Hsi's great synthesis. What has been achieved in Ch'ien Mu's work is an exhibition of Chu Hsi's major concerns in the context of the Confucian tradition as a whole. In conclusion, however, it must be maintained that there is no short cut to Chu Hsi's world of ideas. Ch'ien Mu's *hsin hsüeh-an* on Chu Hsi, like Huang Tsung-hsi's *hsüeh-an* on Wang Yang-ming, is inevitably a contrivance, notwithstanding its seriousness of purpose and perspicuousness of presentation. And no matter how sophisticated the design is, it is no substitute for the wonder, indeed the delight, of reading Chu Hsi's poems, letters, commentaries, and philosophical reflections themselves. The willingness and courage to confront the many "fruitful ambiguities" in the *Literary Works* and *Classified Conversations* is still the closest approximation to meeting Chu Hsi face to face.

TU WEI-MING[dr]

University of California
Berkeley

a. 朱子新學案
b. 朱熹
c. 錢穆
d. 三民
e. 范壽康
f. 唐君毅
g. 牟宗三
h. 思想
i. 學術
j. 王陽明
k. 國史大綱
l. 宋明理學概述
m. 中國近三百年學術史
n. 先秦諸子繫年
o. 劉向歆父子年譜
p. 朱子文集
q. 卷
r. 朱子語類
s. 要旨
t. 理氣
u. 心性
v. 易
w. 詩
x. 書
y. 春秋
z. 禮

aa. 四書
ab. 校勘
ac. 辨偽
ad. 考據
ae. 陸象山
af. 禪
ag. 學案
ah. 黃宗羲
ai. 明儒學案
aj. 覺醒
ak. 范仲淹
al. 王安石
am. 胡瑗
an. 孫復
ao. 李覯
ap. 歐陽修
aq. 司馬光
ar. 李侗
as. 程頤
at. 周敦頤
au. 張載
av. 程顥
aw. 近思錄
ax. 陰陽
ay. 鬼神
az. 天理

ba. 人欲
bb. 善惡
bc. 聖賢
bd. 道器
be. 體用
bf. 命
bg. 忠恕
bh. 知行
bi. 誠思
bj. 心學
bk. 馮友蘭
bl. 理學
bm. 程朱
bn. 陸王
bo. 人心
bp. 道心
bq. 形氣之私
br. 已發
bs. 未發
bt. 涵養
bu. 省察
bv. 敬
bw. 靜
bx. 克己
by. 易簡
bz. 格物

ca. 太極
cb. 氣質之性
cc. 理一
cd. 分殊
ce. 邵雍
cf. 六先生
cg. 游酢
ch. 楊時
ci. 謝良佐
cj. 張南軒
ck. 胡五峯
cl. 知言
cm. 呂祖謙
cn. 朱陸異同
co. 太極圖說
cp. 朱子晚年定論
cq. 遺書
cr. 余英時
cs. 本義
ct. 象數
cu. 義理
cv. 家禮
cw. 實學
cx. 朱子家禮
cy. 顏元
cz. 王懋竑

da. 通鑑綱目
db. 三禮
dc. 儀禮
dd. 禮記
de. 周禮
df. 繼
dg. 道統
dh. 朱子年譜
di. 心體與性體
dj. 朱子及其哲學
dk. 中國哲學原論
dl. 陽明學述要
dm. 從宋明儒學的發展論清代思想史
dn. 中國學人
do. 宋明儒學中智識主義的傳統
dp. 朱子年譜考異
dq. 叢書集成
dr. 杜維明