



The Association for
Asian Studies

Review

Reviewed Work(s): *The Uighur Empire (744-840). According to the T'ang Dynastic Histories*
Occasional Paper. by Colin Mackerras

Review by: Wei-ming Tu

Source: *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Aug., 1969), pp. 844-845

Published by: Association for Asian Studies

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2942426>

Accessed: 13-05-2019 08:55 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Association for Asian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The Journal of Asian Studies*

ment "would not be achieved by an alliance between the commerical stratum of the Chinese economy and Western firms in the treaty ports." The answer appeared to lie in the "*kuan-tu* (government supervision)" half of the symbiosis and accordingly J., M. & Co. turned to probing for the locus of decision making within Chinese officialdom.

In the final three sections (The Firm as Special Agent to the Chinese Government, The Imperial Household, and Railways and Loans) are detailed the approaches and frustrations of the firm in running between and amongst Li Hung-chang in Tientsin, the Imperial Household in Peking, and even provincial authorities, all to little avail. The officials were not sufficiently interested in establishing an industrial infrastructure to risk sharing control either with Chinese entrepreneurs, or with foreigners, or even with their fellow bureaucrats. At no point does J., M. & Co. seem to have considered appealing to the British Government for political help up to 1895.

Dr. LeFevour supplements the study with four brief appendices on Insurance and Banking, Korea, Kerosene, and The Export Trade.

The picture, of course, changed radically after 1895 when the indemnities for the Japan war and the Boxer Uprising forced China into the loan market, when foreigners obtained the right to establish factories, and when outside rivalries and the scramble for concessions finally brought the essential political or decision-making element of "imperialism" and/or "aggression" onto the scene.

I join Dr. LeFevour in bemoaning that the "archives" do not permit the writing of a business history of J., M. & Co. (the records of the closely related sister firm in London, Matheson and Company, are no longer extant), but his study shows that the Jardine material can still be profitably mined, particularly by those equipped to handle Chinese sources.

C. J. STANLEY

Mary Baldwin College

The Uighur Empire (744-840). According to the T'ang Dynastic Histories Occasional Paper. BY COLIN MACKERRAS. Canberra: Center of Oriental Studies, The Austral-

ian National University, 1968. xiii, 187 pp. Appendices, Index, Maps. \$2.00.

The Center of Oriental Studies in Canberra, through the Australian National Press, publishes a continuing series of highly specialized monographs on the language, culture, and history of China. The present volume is certainly a welcome addition to this scholarly enterprise initiated by Professor N. G. D. Malmquist, and vigorously carried out under the present directorship of Professor Liu Ts'un-yan. As the author has pointed out in his preface, this work is an annotated translation of those sections on the Uighurs in the *Chiu T'ang-shu* [CTS] and *Hsin T'ang-shu* [HTS] referring to the period of 744 to 840. To be specific, it is a parallel translation of those sections of the two corresponding *chuan* on the Uighurs in the two T'ang Dynastic Histories. It covers a period designated as the second stage of the history of the Uighurs in the T'ang Dynasty in Haneda Toru's monumental *Todai Kaijōt-sushi no kenkyū*.

The author has made extensive use of traditional Chinese sources and modern scholarship in the Japanese and European languages. The sections in CTS and HTS are carefully checked against their counterparts, when available, in Ts'e-fu yuan-kuei and Ssu-ma Kuang's *Tzu-chih tung-chien*. The author demonstrates his searching and scrupulous scholarship in almost flawless and well-styled translations of many obscure texts, although for some idiomatic expressions, such as *pu-sheng ch'i pi* (p. 35) and *huan-yueh chiu-chih* (p. 49), the translations could be improved. It seems regrettable, however, that the author fails to mention Ch'en Yin-ko's *T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao* (Peking, 1956), especially the third part, which not only provides an interesting background for the present study but, in some respects, throws light on a number of issues in question.

The Uighur Empire tells us many fascinating stories about T'ang China's foreign relations: how the concept of *chi-mi* was actually used as a guiding principle in dealing with the nomadic forces, how the technique of *i-i-chih-i* was applied by the Chinese general, Chang Kuang-sheng, to take advantage of the conflict between the Uighurs and the Sogdians

(pp. 62-64), how the T'ang emperors, Su-tsung and Tai-tsung, through diplomatic manipulations as well as heavy gifts, were able to recruit forces from the Uighurs to suppress internal disorder and ward off foreign invasion, and as a result how much the people of the "Heavenly *Qagan*" (*Tien K'o-han*) were humiliated and plundered by the arrogant Uighurs. It also tells us, sometimes in minute detail, of the *ho-ch'in* system at work. It seems that in addition to prestige, the Uighur *qagan* might have been genuinely fascinated by the charm and gracefulness of the T'ang princesses. The marriage ceremony of Princess T'ai-ho is both informative and enticing to read. On this occasion, the *qagan*, as an expression of his gratitude, sent two thousand chiefs of tribes to welcome the princess. They (p. 108) "brought in, as tribute, 20,000 horses and 1,000 camels. Never before had a delegation from any of the barbarian states to China been as large as this one."

To the Chinese historian, the impact of the Uighurs lies much deeper than foreign relations. It is commonly known that, in order to cope with these "barbarians," the T'ang Court had to make institutional adjustments by setting up new *chou* and *fu* to control them; it had to create various kinds of ritualistic symbols, such as glorious titles, to induce them; it had to accept tremendous financial losses, such as purchasing a large number of old and weak horses to placate them; and, as a last resort, it had to rely upon generals, such as Kuo Tzu-i, to confront them. Since the interaction between domestic politics and "calamities from without" (*wai-huan*) played a unique role in T'ang history, an adequate understanding of the T'ang dynastic configuration depends heavily upon our knowledge of the "barbarian situation." Yet, the complexity of the "barbarian situation" can never be revealed by focusing on only one ethnic group. The rise and fall of the Uighurs would seem too much of a mystery, if we had no ideas about their predecessors and their successors. Indeed, the available sources tell us very little about the economic condition, the political organization, and social structure, and the symbol system of the alleged "Uighur Empire." It is in this connection that the present work

should be appreciated as a study of the relations between the T'ang Empire and the Uighurs, rather than a reconstruction of the so-called Uighur Empire according to the two T'ang Dynastic Histories.

WEI-MING TU

Princeton University

The Mandate of Heaven, Record of a Civil War, China 1945-49. BY JOHN F. MELBY. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968. xiii, 313 pp. Pictures, Index. \$10.00.

Chungking, March 7, 1946. On this day John Melby, member of the United States Embassy to China, recorded in his diary: "[T. V.] Soong made the remark openly the other day that China should not worry about Washington: 'I can handle those boobs'" (p. 98). The evidence of this remarkable chronicle is that T. V. Soong and other prominent leaders of the Kuomintang actually did think and act toward the United States in the way his remark implies and that United States officials, in turn, began to reassess the desirability of remaining allied with the Kuomintang government. Whether or not friendly relations and mutual trust between the KMT and the United States during the late nineteen-forties would have made any difference whatsoever to the outcome of the Chinese civil war, Melby doubts and other opinion is divided. What is not open to doubt is the fact that Sino-American relations during the civil war period were poisonous and that the two governments' different views of postwar China, of appropriate policies to deal with the situation, and of each other have vastly complicated explanations of the Communist victory and understanding of the Communist chapter of the Chinese revolution. Melby's book is a valuable source for the scholar who wishes to study this aspect of the problem.

John Melby arrived in Kunming November 1, 1945, to join the U. S. Embassy staff, having been encouraged by Averell Harriman to take the post because of Melby's previous work in Moscow. Harriman believed that it was wise to place men around the world in 1945 who were knowledgeable about Communists and Communism, although there is no evidence in this book that Melby was in