

Review

Reviewed Work(s): Shunjū Kuyōgaku no rinri shisō : Handan hōshiki ni tsuite 春秋公羊學の倫理思想 (判斷方式について) . Tōyōshi kenkyū 23 by Toshikuni Hihara and 日原利國

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conscious effort of choosing the viewpoint of the state under invasion again indicates a kind of critical idealism. For the historical judgment in question is based on a higher moral, or rather humanitarian, principle transcending the actual forces at play. Under 3. the author gives us specific information concerning relationships between king-minister, father-son, husband-wife and brother-brother. Toward the end he also makes passing reference to the fifth cardinal relationship in Confucianism, friend-friend.

[Tu Wei-ming

718. HIHARA Toshikuni 日原利國, *Shunjū Kuyōgaku no rinri shisō : Handan bōshiki ni tsuite 春秋公羊學の倫理思想 (判断方式について)*. Tōyōshi kenkyū 23, pp. 237-276.

The author seeks to establish the thesis that in the Kung-yang school of the *Cb'un-ch'iu* tradition, moral judgments are basically, if not exclusively, founded on « motivationalism ». In other words, the motivational tendency — its timing, its intensity, its moral quality, and its results — is held as the basis of moral judgments. The act in itself is relegated to the background. To establish his point, he uses a large number of concrete examples from the *Cb'un-ch'iu* to illustrate how in the formulation of moral judgments, motivation rather than tangible act is the focus of attention. The author's insistence on what he refers to as the « subjectivism » of the Kung-yang school is in essence a response to NIIDA Noboru's criticism of his earlier account of the same issue in his study on subjectivism in the « Penal laws » of the Han dynasty. NIIDA contended that moral judgments of the Kung-yang school are based on both the tangible acts and the motivational directions behind them. The author, however, argues that « moral judgment in the Kung-yang school was rendered without regard for action as such (the objective factor) but only in consideration of the will (the subjective factor) ». The article presents us with a body of literature organized in such a way as to prove the thesis of the author. In so doing, a large number of pertinent cases concerning the motivational element in formulating moral judgments are assembled together. Even though the single-minded insistence on subjectivism is not very convincing, the usefulness of the article for further research is tremendous.

[Tu Wei-ming

719. T' IEN Tsung-yao 田宗堯, *Yen-tzu cb'un-ch'iu chiao-cheng 晏子春秋校正*. WSCHP 13, pp. 249-291.

Suite de notes érudites sur des passages du *Yen-tzu cb'un-ch'iu 晏子春秋*. L'auteur s'est reporté aux principaux commentateurs de l'époque des Ch'ing